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ABSTRACT
Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
by
Ramoni Olaoluwa Lasisi, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Vicki H. Allan
Department: Computer Science
Weighted voting games are classic cooperative games which provide compact represen-
tation for coalition formation models in human societies and multiagent systems. As useful
as weighted voting games are in modeling cooperation among players, they are, however,
not immune from the vulnerability of manipulations (i.e., dishonest behaviors) by strategic
players that may be present in the games. With the possibility of manipulations, it becomes
difficult to establish or maintain trust, and, more importantly, it becomes difficult to assure
fairness in such games. For these reasons, we conduct careful experimental investigations
and analyses of the effects of manipulations in weighted voting games, including those of
manipulation by splitting, merging, and annexation. These manipulations involve an agent
or some agents misrepresenting their identities in anticipation of gaining more power or
obtaining a higher portion of a coalition’s profits at the expense of other agents in a game.
We consider investigation of some criteria for the evaluation of game’s robustness to
manipulation. These criteria have been defined on the basis of theoretical and experimen-
tal analysis. For manipulation by splitting, we provide empirical evidence to show that the
three prominent indices for measuring agents’ power, Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-
Packel, are all susceptible to manipulation when an agent splits into several false identi-
ties. We extend a previous result on manipulation by splitting in exact unanimity weighted
iii
voting games to the Deegan-Packel index, and present new results for excess unanimity
weighted voting games. We partially resolve an important open problem concerning the
bounds on the extent of power that a manipulator may gain when it splits into several false
identities in non-unanimity weighted voting games. Specifically, we provide the first three
non-trivial bounds for this problem using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. One of
the bounds is also shown to be asymptotically tight.
Furthermore, experiments on non-unanimity weighted voting games show that the
three indices are highly susceptible to manipulation via annexation while they are less
susceptible to manipulation via merging. Given that the problems of calculating the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices for weighted voting games are NP-complete, we show that, when
the manipulators’ coalitions sizes are restricted to a small constant, manipulators need to
do only a polynomial amount of work to find a much improved power gain for both merging
and annexation, and then present two enumeration-based pseudo-polynomial algorithms
that manipulators can use. Finally, we argue and provide empirical evidence to show that
despite finding the optimal beneficial merge is an NP-hard problem for both the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices, finding beneficial merge is relatively easy in practice. Also,
while it appears that we may be powerless to stop manipulation by merging for a given
game, we suggest a measure, termed quota ratio, that the game designer may be able to
control. Thus, we deduce that a high quota ratio decreases the number of beneficial merges.
(128 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Ramoni Olaoluwa Lasisi
This dissertation investigates weighted voting games and three methods of manipulat-
ing those games, called splitting, merging, and annexation. The manipulations involve an
agent or some agents misrepresenting their identities in anticipation of gaining more power
over the outcomes of games. Indeed, in open anonymous environments, manipulation can
be easy and cheap to achieve. We provide clear and sufficient discussion on related work and
backgrounds to motivate this research topic, which certainly deserves attention. Weighted
voting games are among key cooperative games, and the manipulations considered in this
dissertation are natural, and have practical applications, that are likely to raise interests in
the game theory and artificial intelligence communities.
We provide interesting theoretical and simulation results for the two broad classes
of weighted voting games - unanimity and non-unanimity weighted voting games. In the
anaylses and experiments, the following prominent power indices are considered to mea-
sure the influence of players: Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel. The results we
propose in this work fit under the models of deception and fraud, as well as models and
mechanisms for establishing identities. If an agent can increase its power, as evidenced
by a power index, it is more likely to employ any of these forms of manipulation, and it
becomes difficult to maintain trust. Thus, awareness of various levels of power indices sus-
ceptibility to manipulation allows users to informatively select a power index. This provides
some assurance of identity, which is crucial for establishing and maintaining trustworthy
interactions. This study also increases our indepth understanding of these manipulations in
weighted voting games and their effects, which may provide insights that are needed in the
development of methods to reduce the effects of the menace in the future.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are important in multiagent systems because of their
usage in automated decisions making. One way of modeling cooperation among players
for making joint decisions that is frequently found in the real world is via the use of
WVGs [1]. WVGs are widely studied [2–4]. Prominent real-life situations where WVGs have
found applications include the United Nations Security Council, the Electoral College of the
United States, the International Monetary Fund [5, 6], the Council of Ministers, and the
European Community [2]. Other areas of application of WVGs include economics, political
science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory, distributed systems [7], and multi-
robot team formation for distributed coverage [8]. Also, Nordmann and Pham [9] have con-
sidered reliability and cost evaluation of weighted dynamic-threshold voting-systems. These
systems are used in target detection, pattern recognition, safety monitoring, and human
organization systems. The issue of WVGs design has also recently received the attention of
many reseachers in the field. See the work of [10–12] for some examples of WVGs design
issues.
WVGs represent mathematical abstractions of voting systems. In a WVG, a quota is
given and each voter has an associated weight. Voters express their opinions through their
votes by electing candidates to represent them or influence the passage of bills. A subset
of agents, called a coalition, whose total weight meets or exceeds the quota, is said to be
winning. However, in the more traditional homogeneous voting system [13], which is a special
case of voting in which all voters have unit weight, the winning coalition is determined by
the majority of the agents. A voter’s weight in a game is the number of votes controlled by
the voter, and this is the maximum number of votes she is permitted to cast. The weights
2of agents may correspond to resources or skills available to the agents, while the quota is
the amount of resources or skills required for a task to be accomplished. For example, in
search and rescue, robotic agents put their resources (i.e., weights) together in large natural
disaster environments to reach the necessary levels (i.e., quota) to save life and property.
It is natural to naively think that the numerical weight of an agent directly determines
the corresponding strength of the agent in a WVG. The measure of the strength of an agent
in a game is termed its power. This is the ability of an agent to influence the decision-making
process. Although a larger weight by an agent makes it more likely that an agent affects
the outcome of a WVG, the weight of an agent in a game is not typically proportional to
its power [14]. Consider, for example, a WVG of three voters, a1, a2, and a3 with respective
weights 6, 3, and 1. When the quota for the game is 10, then a coalition consisting of all
the three voters is needed to win the game. Thus, each of the voters is of equal importance
in achieving the winning coalition. Hence, they each have equal power irrespective of their
weight distribution, in that every voter is necessary for a win. The three prominent power
indices for computing agents’ power found in the literature are the Shapley-Shubik [15],
Banzhaf [16, 17], and Deegan-Packel [18] indices. These power indices are used in this
dissertation to analyze the effects of manipulations in WVGs. Other lesser known power
indices are the Holler-Packel [19] and Johnston [20] power indices.
The Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices satisfy the axioms that char-
acterize a power index, have gained wide usage in political arena, and are the main power
indices found in the literature [3]. The indices have been defined on the framework of sub-
sets of winning coalitions in the game they seek to evaluate. A wide variation in the results
they provide can be observed. This is due to the different methods of computation of the
associated subsets of the winning coalitions.These indices measure the influence of voters
differently.
Computing the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices of players in
WVGs is NP-complete [4, 21], and admits pseudo-polynomial algorithms using dynamic
programming. Efficient exact algorithms using generating functions [22, 23] also exist for
3both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, where the weights of all agents in the WVGs
are restricted to integers. Deng and Papadimitriou [24] have shown that computing the
Shapley values of players in WVGs is #P-complete. We also note that efficient approxima-
tion algorithms exist for computing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The work of
Bachrach et al. [25] and Fatima et al. [26] provide examples on approximating power indices
in WVGs.
The problem of insincere and manipulative behaviors in votings or elections among
agents is a fundamental problem that has received attention of many reseachers. Different
forms of insincere and manipulative behaviors have been considered. See the recent work of
[27–29]. According to Zuckerman et al. [30], these insincere behaviors include manipulation
(dishonest behavior by voters), control (dishonest behavior by the election authority), and
bribery (dishonest behavior by an outside party). We are concerned in this dissertation with
only the first form of insincere behavior from above, i.e., manipulations involving dishonest
behaviors by players in a game.
Manipulations have been considered in non-cooperative games such as auctions [31,32],
cooperative games [33], and in open anonymous environments [34], such as the internet. The
maiden study of this behavior in the context of weighted voting is the work of [35]. WVGs are
useful in modeling cooperation among players for making joint decisions, but they are not
immune from the vulnerability of manipulations by strategic players in the games. With
the possibility of manipulation, it becomes difficult to establish or maintain trust, and
it becomes difficult to assure fairness in such games. We provide a detailed study and
analysis of the effects of three forms of manipulation in WVGs, called splitting, merging,
and annexation [2, 35–37].
In manipulation by splitting, an agent, termed a manipulating agent, may alter a
WVG by splitting its identity into multiple names and distributing its weight across all
the associated names. This misrepresentation may allow the manipulating agent to gain
more power over the outcome of a game. The altered game consists of the non-manipulating
agents in the original game and the several identities, termed false agents, into which a
4manipulating agent splits. The power of the manipulating agent is thus the sum of the
power of all its associated false agents in the altered game. The manipulating agent hopes
that the value of its accumulated power (from the false agents) will be greater than its value
in the original game. Manipulation occurs when manipulating agents achieve an increase in
power with respect to the original WVGs they manipulate.
WVGs are also subject to another method of manipulation, called merging, which is
also known as alliance or collusion. This manipulation involves coordinated action among
some agents who come together to form a bloc by merging their weights into a single weight
in order to have more power over the outcomes of games [2, 37]. In a beneficial merge,
merged agents are compensated commensurate with their share of the power gained by the
bloc. The agents whose weights are merged into a bloc are referred to as assimilated agents
since they can no more vote as individual voters in the new game. Agents in the merged
bloc are assumed to be working cooperatively and have transferable utility. Thus, proceeds
from merging can easily be distributed among the manipulators without bickering.
Finally, in manipulation by annexation, an agent, termed an annexer, usurps the voting
weights of some other agents in a game [2,37]. We also refer to agents whose voting weights
were acquired as the assimilated agents. The new game consists of the previous agents in
the original game whose weights were not annexed and the bloc of agents made up of the
annexer and the assimilated agents. The annexer also incurs some compensation that is
made to the assimilated agents to forfeit their weights.
The major difference between manipulation by merging and annexation is that, in
merging, the assimilated agents must be compensated commensurate with their share of
the power gained by the bloc if the merging is beneficial, while in annexation, only the
annexer is compensated for the participation of the group. Annexed agents are assumed to
either voluntarily forfeit their weight or be compensated on a one-time basis that is not
related to power.
51.2 Motivation
Manipulation in open anonymous environments, such as the internet, is hard to de-
tect. According to Yokoo et al. [34], the manipulation can come in several forms which
include collusion or false-name, where a single agent is acting as many agents i.e., split-
ting. Thus, the increased use of online systems (such as trading systems or peer-to-peer
networks where WVGs are also applicable) mean that manipulation remains an important
challenge that calls for attention. Bachrach and Elkind [35] have also interpreted identity
splitting in WVGs as agents trying to obtain a higher share of the grand coalition’s gain or
obtaining more political power by splitting a political party into several other parties with
similar political platforms. The authors then conjectured that false-name manipulation by
splitting is widespread in the real world and stands to pose serious issues in multiagent
environments. Furthermore, Felsenthal and Machover [2, 37] consider a real life example of
annexation where a shareholder buys the voting shares of some other shareholders in a firm
in order to use them for her own interest. Clearly, this action allows the annexer to possess
more shares and makes it easier for her to affect the outcomes of decisions in the firm.
WVGs can be viewed as a form of competition among agents to share the available
fixed power whose total value is always 1. Agents may thus resort to a form of manipulation
(splitting, merging, or annexation) to improve their influence in anticipation of gaining more
power. From the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that manipulation by splitting, merging,
and annexation in WVGs is undesirable. The power increase achieved by manipulating
agents is at the expense of other agents in a game who are being denied the utility that is
due to them.
This research is primarily motivated by the reasons stated above and the need to pro-
vide insights into understanding the details of the problem of insincere and manipulative
behaviors. Furthermore, previous work [14,36] has shown that the problem of finding benefi-
cial split, merge, or annexation is NP-hard for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power
indices, and leave the impression that this is indeed so in practice. Although this worst
case complexity for manipulation is daunting enough to discourage would-be manipulators,
6nonetheless, it is possible that real life instances of WVGs are easy to manipulate. We note
that real WVGs are small enough that exponential amount of work may not deter manipu-
lators from participating in manipulations. According to [12], the number of players in most
real life examples of WVGs is between 10 and 50. Hence, there may be little deterrent to
manipulation in practice considering the NP-hardness results of the previous work.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents prelim-
inaries to provide necessary backgrounds in WVGs, power indices, and formal problem
definition of manipulation by splitting, merging, and annexation in WVGs. Chapter 3 con-
siders susceptibility of power indices to manipulation by splitting. We present new bounds
on manipulation by splitting into several false identities in WVGs in Chapter 4. Chapters 5
and 6 respectively consider experimental investigation and analyses of the effects of manip-
ulation by merging and annexation in WVGs. We conclude in Chapter 7 and give directions
for future work.
7CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Definitions and Notation
We give the following definitions and notation that are used throughout the disserta-
tion. Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n ∈ N agents. Let {w1, . . . , wn} be the corresponding
weights of these agents. The non-empty subsets, C ⊆ I, are called coalitions. The set I of
all agents is also referred to as the grand coalition.
Definition 1. Weighted Voting Game.
A WVG with quota q ∈ R involving agents I is represented as [w1, . . . , wn; q]. Denote by
w(C), the weight of a coalition, C, derived as the summation of the weights of agents in C,
i.e., w(C) =
∑
j∈C wj . A coalition, C, wins in a game if w(C) ≥ q, otherwise it loses. WVGs
belong to the class of simple voting games. In simple voting games, each coalition, C, has
an associated function v : C → {0, 1}. The value 1 implies a win for C and 0 implies a
loss. So, v(C) = 1 if w(C) ≥ q and 0 otherwise.
The weights of the agents are given in non-increasing order, i.e., w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥
wn. Note that this assumption does not affect the definition of the game or the generality
of our results. See also the work of [4, 30] where this assumption has also been used.
Definition 2. Dummy and Critical Agents.
An agent i in a coalition C is dummy if its weight is not needed for C to be a winning
coalition, i.e., w(C\{i}) ≥ q. Otherwise, it is critical to C, i.e., w(C) ≥ q and w(C\{i}) < q.
Definition 3. Unanimity and Non-Unanimity Weighted Voting Games.
A game is a unanimity WVG if there is a single winning coalition in the game, and
every agent in the game is critical to the coalition, otherwise, it is termed a non-unanimity
8WVG. We use the terms exact unanimity, for unanimity WVGs having total weight of
agents, w(I), in the game equal to the quota i.e., w(I) = q, and excess unanimity, for
unanimity WVGs with total weight of agents greater than the quota i.e., w(I) > q.
Definition 4. Minimal Winning Coalition.
A winning coalition C is a minimal winning coalition if every proper subset of C is a
losing coalition, i.e. w(C) ≥ q and ∀T ⊂ C, w(T ) < q.
Definition 5. Power Vectors.
The power vector of a WVG of n agents is simply an n-dimensional vector v ∈ Rn
of the power of each of the agents in the game listed in order. The power of the agents is
computed using a power index.
Definition 6. Shapley-Shubik Power Index.
The Shapley-Shubik power index quantifies the marginal contribution of an agent to the
grand coalition. Each permutation of the agents is considered. We term an agent pivotal in
a permutation if the agents preceding it do not form a winning coalition, but by adding this
agent, a winning coalition is formed. The Shapley-Shubik index assigns power to each agent
based on the proportion of times (in all permutations) it is pivotal . We formally specify the
computation of the power index using notation of [35]. Denote by pi a permutation of the
agents, so pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} and by Π the set of all possible permutations. Denote
by Spi(i) the predecessors of agent i in pi, i.e., Spi(i) = {j : pi(j) < pi(i)}. The Shapley-Shubik
index, ϕi(G), for each agent i in a WVG G is given by
ϕi(G) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
[v(Spi(i) ∪ {i})− v(Spi(i))]. (2.1)
For example, consider a WVG G = [10, 7, 6, 4; 18] of four agents. We compute the
Shapley-Shubik power of the first agent (with weight 10) as follows. The agent is pivotal
in 12 of the 4! = 24 permutations in the game. See Figure 2.1 for the 24 permutations
in this game. So, the Shapley-Shubik index of the agent, ϕ1(G) =
12
24 = 0.50. Similarly,
9Figure 2.1. The 24 permutations in the game G = [10, 7, 6, 4; 18] with the quota indicated
as a line through all the permutations indicating the pivotal positions in the permutations.
the second (weight 7), third (weight 6), and fourth (weight 4) agents are pivotal in only
four permutations each. Thus, the power of each of these agents is 424 = 0.167. The agent
crossing the quota line is pivotal at that position. The power vector for this game using the
Shapley-Shubik power index is [0.500, 0.167, 0.167, 0.167].
Definition 7. Banzhaf Power Index.
The Banzhaf power index computation for an agent i is the proportion of times i is
critical compared to the total number of times any agent in the game is critical. The Banzhaf
index, βi(G), for each agent i in a WVG G is given by
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βi(G) =
ηi(G)∑
j∈I ηj(G)
(2.2)
where ηi(G) is the number of winning coalitions in which agent i is critical in game G.
Consider using the Banzhaf index to compute the power of the first agent in the WVG
G = [10, 7, 6, 4; 18]. There are four winning coalitions in the game: {{10, 7, 6}, {10, 6, 4},
{10, 7, 4},{10,7,6,4}}. The critical agents in each of the winning coalitions are underlined. The
first agent (weight 10) is critical four times. The second (weight 7), third (weight 6), and
fourth (weight 4) agents are critical in only two winning coalitions each. So, the Banzhaf
index of the first agent, β1(G) =
4
4+2+2+2 = 0.40. Similarly, the power of each of the sec-
ond, third, and fourth agent is 24+2+2+2 = 0.20. The power vector for this game using the
Banzhaf power index is [0.40, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20].
Definition 8. Deegan-Packel Power Index.
The Deegan-Packel power index limits consideration for the computation of agents’
power to the minimal winning coalitions in a game. Let MWC be the set of all minimal
winning coalitions in a WVG G and MWCi be the set of all the minimal winning coalitions
in game G that include agent i. The Deegan-Packel power index, γi(G), for each agent i in
game G is given by
γi(G) =
1
|MWC|
∑
C∈MWCi
1
|C| . (2.3)
We compute the Deegan-Packel power of the first agent for WVG G = [10, 7, 6, 4; 18].
There are three minimal winning coalitions in this game: {{10, 7, 6}, {10, 6, 4}, {10, 7, 4}},
and the first agent (with weight 10) belongs to all of them. The Deegan-Packel index of the
agent, γ1(G) =
1
3
(
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3
)
= 0.33. Similarly, the second (weight 7), third (weight 6),
and fourth (weight 4) agents belong to two of the minimal winning coalitions each. Thus,
the power of each of these agents is 13
(
1
3 +
1
3
)
= 0.22. The power vector for this game using
the Deegan-Packel power index is [0.33, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22].
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Observe that the power vectors computed by the three indices are different. The im-
portance of power indices as solution concepts for measuring voting power and in the dis-
tribution of payoffs make them natural targets for manipulators [30].
2.2 Formal Problem Definition
We provide formal definitions of manipulation by splitting, merging, and annexation in
WVGs. Let k ∈ N. Let φ be any of Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, or Deegan-Packel index. De-
note by (φ1(G), . . . , φn(G)) ∈ [0, 1]n the power of agents in a WVG G of n agents.
2.2.1 Manipulation by Splitting
When an agent engages in manipulation by splitting, the number of agents in the new
game increases by the number of false agents formed by splitting. The quota and weights
of other agents in the new game remain the same. The sum of the power of the false agents
becomes the power of the manipulator in the new game. The extent of power gained or lost
for a manipulator can be measured as a fraction of power of the manipulator in the new
game and its power in the original game.
Let agent i ∈ I with weight wi in game G be a manipulating agent. Suppose agent
i splits its weight among k ≥ 2 false agents, i1, . . . , ik, having corresponding weights,
wi1 , . . . , wik , such that wi =
∑k
j=1wij and wij > 0 for all j. We have a new set of agents
after splitting: I ′ = {1, . . . , i− 1, i1, . . . , ik, i+ 1, . . . , n}. The initial game G of n agents has
been altered by agent i to give a new WVG G′ of n+k−1 agents. Thus, for a manipulating
agent i with power φi(G) in G, the sum of the power of the k ≥ 2 false agents in G′ that the
manipulating agent splits is
∑k
j=1 φij (G
′). The ratio τ =
∑k
j=1 φij (G
′)
φi(G)
compares the sum of
the power of the false agents in the altered game G′ to the power of the manipulator (before
it splits) in the original game G. τ gives a factor of the power gained or lost by agent i
when it alters game G to give G′. We say that φ is susceptible to manipulation by splitting
if there exists a game G′ such that τ > 1; the split is termed advantageous or beneficial. If
τ < 1, then the split is disadvantageous or non-beneficial, while the split is neutral when
τ = 1.
12
2.2.2 Manipulation by Merging
Manipulation by merging is the voluntary coordinated action of would-be manipulators
who come together to form a bloc. Agents in the bloc are assimilated voters since they can
no more vote as individual voters in the new game, rather as a bloc. The new game consists
of the agents in the original game that are not assimilated as well as the bloc formed by
the assimilated voters. The power of the bloc in the new game is compared to the sum of
the individual powers of all the members of the bloc in the original game.
Let 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Consider a manipulators’ coalition C of k agents which is a k-subset
of the n-set I. We assume that C contains k distinct elements chosen from I. Suppose the
manipulators in C voluntarily merge into a single bloc denoted by &C, i.e., agents i ∈ C
have been assimilated into the bloc &C, then, we have a new set of agents in the game after
merging. Thus, the initial game G of n agents has been altered by the manipulators to give
a new WVG G′ consisting of the bloc and other agents not in the bloc i.e., I\C. Thus, for
the manipulating agents i ∈ C with power φi(G) in game G, the sum of the power of the k
manipulators is
∑
i∈C φi(G), while that of the bloc formed by the manipulators in game G
′ is
φ&C(G
′). The ratio τ = φ&C(G
′)∑
i∈C φi(G)
compares the power index of the assimilated bloc formed
by merging in the altered game G′ to the sum of the original power indices of the agents
in the merged bloc. τ gives a factor of the power gained or lost by the manipulators when
they alter game G to give G′. The power index, φ, is said to be susceptible to manipulation
by merging in game G if there exists a game G′ such that τ > 1; the merging is termed
advantageous or beneficial. If τ < 1, then the merging is disadvantageous or non-beneficial,
while the merging is neutral when τ = 1.
2.2.3 Manipulation by Annexation
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Consider a manipulators’ coalition C of k agents which is a k-subset
of the n-set I. We assume that C contains k distinct elements chosen from I. Suppose
agent i /∈ C alters game G by annexing coalition C i.e., i assimilates the agents in C to
form a bloc denoted by &(C ∪ {i}), then, we have a new set of agents in the game after
annexation. Thus, the initial game G of n agents has been altered by the annexer to give a
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new WVG G′ consisting of the bloc and other agents not in the bloc i.e., I\(C ∪ {i}). The
ratio τ =
φ&(C∪{i})(G′)
φi(G)
compares the power of the assimilated bloc formed by annexation
in the altered game G′ to the power of the annexer in the original game G. τ gives a
factor of the power gained or lost by annexer i when it alters game G to give G′. We say
that φ is susceptible to manipulation by annexation if there exists a game G′ such that
τ > 1; the annexation is termed advantageous or beneficial. If τ < 1, then the annexation
is disadvantageous or non-beneficial, while the annexation is neutral when τ = 1. For the
sake of simplicity in our discussion and analysis, we also refer to the factor of increment as
power gain or benefit.
2.3 Simulating Weighted Voting Games
In this section, we provide a description of the methods used in generating the WVGs
that are used for all our experiments, and the reasons why the methods have been em-
ployed. In view of the computational complexity of computing the power indices exactly
from their definitions, we consider only WVGs with weights of the players in such games
restricted to integers. We have thus implemented the efficient exact pseudo-polynomial
methods of computing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for integer weights using
generating functions [22, 23]. The Deegan-Packel power index is computed directly from
its definition by using an efficient algorithm to find the subsets of agents in a game. The
algorithm to compute the subsets defines a search known as a Hamiltonian walk that visits
each corner of an n-cube exactly once, where n is the number of elements in the set [38].
When creating a new game, the quota, q, of the game is randomly generated such that
1
2w(I) < q ≤ w(I), where w(I) is the sum of the weights of agents I in the game. Quota
has thus been defined as needing at least half of the total weight by a coalition to win in a
game. The number of agents, n, in each of the WVGs is chosen uniformly at random from the
set {10, 11, . . . , 20}. We have limited the number of agents to 20 for reasons of complexity
in the computation of the Deegan-Packel index for large games. Although, the efficient
exact pseudo-polynomial methods for computing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices
described above are appropriate for computing the indices for large voting bodies [39], where
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the numbers of players in the games are greater than 20. However, this is not the case for the
method used in computing the Deegan-Packel index. This choice of the number of agents
in our experiments is consistent with the empirical evaluations of previous research, such
as [25] and [14], where the number of agents in their experiments are respectively 13 and
24.
2.4 Statistical Distributions to Generate Weights
The integer weights of agents in each of the WVGs are generated using uniform, normal,
and Poisson distributions. The following subsections give descriptions of how agents’ weights
are generated using the three distributions.
Weights Generation Using Uniform Distribution
The weights of agents in each game are chosen such that all weights are integers and
drawn from a uniform distribution, U(2,W ), where W ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 90}. U(a, b) defines a
uniform distribution over the interval (a, b), where both a and b are finite.
Weights Generation Using Normal Distribution
The weights of agents in each game are chosen such that all weights are integers and
drawn from a normal distribution, N(µ, σ2), where µ and σ2 are the mean and variance. We
use a mean of µ = 50 and values of standard deviation σ from the set {5, 10, . . . , 40}.
Weights Generation Using Poisson Distribution
The weights of agents in each game are chosen such that all weights are integers and
drawn from a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λ), where parameter λ is the mean of the dis-
tribution. We use a mean of λ = 50.
We note that the parameters in these distributions are sufficient to see patterns of
behaviors in our experiments and as well provide some generalization on the evaluation
of the effects of manipulations in the WVGs. Furthermore, these weights are reflective of
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realistic voting procedures as the weights of agents in real votings are not too large [35]. For
example, the highest weight of the members of the Electoral College of the United States
is 55 (held by the state of California) in the 2012 electoral votes.
2.5 Main Contributions
Until now, the experimental investigation and analysis of the effects of manipulation in
WVGs that we consider in this dissertation is yet to be researched. We provide a summary
of our major contributions for the three forms of manipulation in WVGs.
2.5.1 Results for Manipulation by Splitting
Previous work has considered manipulation by splitting in WVGs. Upper and lower
bounds on the extent of power that a manipulator may gain exist for the case when a
manipulator splits into exactly two false identities for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf
indices. The bounds on the case when an agent splits into more than two false identities has
remained open for the three power indices. Our main contributions for the manipulation
when an agent split into several false identities are highlighted below. The publications
associated with these results are [40,41].
• We extend a previous result of Aziz and Paterson [36] on exact unanimity WVGs to
the Deegan-Packel index. Specifically, we show that in an exact unanimity WVG, if
the Deegan-Packel index is used to compute agents’ power, it is advantageous for an
agent to split up into several false agents.
• We present new results for excess unanimity WVGs using the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indices. Specifically, we propose new bounds for situations when the original
games are excess unanimity WVGs and the resulting games after splitting are non-
unanimity WVGs.
• We provide empirical evidence to show that the three indices (i.e., Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel) are all susceptible to manipulation in non-unanimity
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WVGs when an agent splits into several false identities. However, that the Deegan-
Packel index is more susceptible than the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices.
• Finally, we provide the first three non-trivial bounds when a manipulator splits into
k > 2 false identities using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. One of the bounds
is also shown to be asymptotically tight (i.e., there exists at least a game in which an
agent achieves the proposed bounds by splitting into several false identites).
2.5.2 Results for Manipulations by Annexation and Merging
Little work exists on manipulation via annexation and merging in WVGs. Our main
contributions on the experimental analysis of the effects of annexation and merging in
WVGs are highlighted below. The publications associated with these results are [42–46].
• For unanimity WVGs of n agents:
a. Contrary to Aziz and Paterson [36] that for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf
indices it is advantageous for a player to annex, we show that this is not true in its
entirety. Apart from the fact that manipulation by annexation always increases
the power of other agents that are not annexed by the same factor of increment
as an annexer achieves, the annexer also incurs some compensation that is made
to the assimilated agents to forfeit their weights, thus, reducing the benefit the
annexer thought it gained.
b. The upper bound on the extent to which an annexer may gain while annexing
other agents in an altered game is at most n times the power of the agent in the
original game. This result holds for the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-
Packel power indices.
• The Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices are all highly susceptible
to manipulation via annexation in non-unanimity WVGs. On the other hand, the
three indices are all less susceptible to manipulation via merging in non-unanimity
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WVGs. The Shapley-Shubik index is the most susceptible of the three indices for both
manipulation via annexation and merging.
• We show that manipulators need to do only a polynomial amount of work to find
a much improved power gain over a simple random approach to manipulation and
present two enumeration-based pseudo-polynomial algorithms that manipulators can
use. Our enumeration-based methods are shown to achieve significant improvement in
benefits for manipulators in several numerical experiments. Thus, unlike the simple
random approach (where merging has little or no benefits for the manipulators using
the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices), results from our experiments suggest that
merging can be highly effective for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices.
• We propose simple heuristics for manipulation by annexation in WVGs, and as well
present careful analysis of the performance of the heuristics.
• Finally, despite finding the optimal beneficial merge is an NP-hard problem for both
the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, results from our experiments show that find-
ing a beneficial merge is relatively easy in practice. While it appears impossible to stop
manipulation by merging for a given game, controlling a suggested measure, termed
quota ratio, is desirable. We deduce that a high quota ratio reduces the percentage of
beneficial merges, and then conclude that the Banzhaf index may be more desirable
to avoid merging, especially for high quota ratios.
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CHAPTER 3
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF POWER INDICES TO
MANIPULATION BY SPLITTING
3.1 Overview
Research in manipulation in WVGs has been active [14,35,36]. However, in this earlier
research, false-name manipulation by splitting has been restricted to the case of when a
manipulating agent splits into exactly two false identities, and using only the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices to evaluate agents’ power. Many of the NP-hardness results
of Aziz et al. [14] for splitting into exactly two false identities (using the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf indices) also hold for splitting into several false identities, however, results
quantifying the extent of power gained by a manipulating agent when it splits into several
false identities for the three power indices were unspecified, until our work.
In this chapter, we provide examples to illustrate manipulation by splitting into sev-
eral false identities. Second, we extend a previous result on exact unanimity WVGs to
the Deegan-Packel index, and present new results for excess unanimity WVGs. Specifi-
cally, we propose new bounds for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices on the
extent of gains a manipulator may achieve when the original game is an excess unanimity
WVG and the resulting game after splitting is a non-unanimity WVG. Third, we demon-
strate a simple approach to weight splitting into several false identities for manipulat-
ing agents : simple sampling procedure, which simplifies manipulation by splitting in non-
unanimity WVGs. Fourth, we consider experimental investigation and analysis of manipula-
tion by splitting in non-unanimity WVGs using the three power indices to compute agents’
power. Finally, we conduct normality tests on some real-world weighted voting systems to
provide some justifications on the use of the normal distribution to generate agents’ weights
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for experiments in the remaining chapters of the dissertation.
3.2 Examples of Manipulation by Splitting
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that only one of the agents is engaging in manip-
ulation by splitting.
Example 1. Advantageous split.
Let G = [6, 5, 4, 4,3; 12] be a WVG of five agents. Consider the fifth agent (with weight
3) shown in bold. The power of the agent in this game using the three indices are:
Shapley-Shubik index: ϕ5(G) = 0.167
Banzhaf index: β5(G) = 0.172
Deegan-Packel index: γ5(G) = 0.185
Suppose the agent is a manipulator that splits into three false identities with weights 1
each. We have a new game G′ = [6, 5, 4, 4,1,1,1; 12] with the false agents shown in bold. The
power of each of the false agents and the sum of the power of the false agents for each of
the power indices in G′ are:
Shapley-Shubik index: ϕ51(G
′) = ϕ52(G′) = ϕ53(G′) = 0.057. The sum of the power
of the false agents,
∑3
j=1 ϕ5j (G
′) = 3× 0.057 = 0.171
Banzhaf index: β51(G
′) = β52(G′) = β53(G′) = 0.059. The sum of the power of the
false agents,
∑3
j=1 β5j (G
′) = 3× 0.059 = 0.177
Deegan-Packel index: γ51(G
′) = γ52(G′) = γ53(G′) = 0.116. The sum of the power of
the false agents,
∑3
j=1 γ5j (G
′) = 3× 0.116 = 0.348
The factor by which the manipulator gains using the three indices are as follows.
Shapley-Shubik index: 0.1710.167 = 1.02
Banzhaf index: 0.1770.172 = 1.03
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Deegan-Packel index: 0.3480.185 = 1.88
Example 2. Disadvantageous split.
Let G = [9, 9,8, 2, 1; 20] be a WVG of five agents. Consider the third agent (with weight
8) shown in bold. The power of the agent in this game using the three power indices are as
follows.
Shapley-Shubik index: ϕ3(G) = 0.183
Banzhaf index: β3(G) = 0.182
Deegan-Packel index: γ3(G) = 0.208.
Suppose the agent splits into five false identities with weights 2, 2, 2, 1, 1. We have a new
game G′ = [9, 9,2,2,2, 2,1,1, 1; 20] with the false agents shown in bold. The power of each
of the false agents and the sum of the power of the false agents for each of the power indices
in game G′ are as follows.
Shapley-Shubik index: ϕ31(G
′) = ϕ32(G′) = ϕ33(G′) = 0.038 and ϕ34(G′) = ϕ35(G′) =
0.032. The sum of the power of the false agents,
∑5
j=1 ϕ3j (G
′) = 0.177
Banzhaf index: β31(G
′) = β32(G′) = β33(G′) = 0.021 and β34(G′) = β35(G′) =
0.014. The sum of the power of the false agents,
∑5
j=1 β3j (G
′) = 0.092
Deegan-Packel index: γ31(G
′) = γ32(G′) = γ33(G′) = 0.065 and γ34(G′) = γ35(G′) =
0.083. The sum of the power of the false agents,
∑5
j=1 γ3j (G
′) = 0.361
The factor by which the manipulator loses (for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices)
and gains (for the Deegan-Packel index) are as follows.
Shapley-Shubik index: 0.1770.183 = 0.97
Banzhaf index: 0.0920.182 = 0.50
Deegan-Packel index1: 0.3610.208 = 1.74
1Note that this game is advantageous using the Deegan-Packel power index.
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We have shown that a manipulator may gain or lose power using the three power indices
when it engages in manipulation by splitting into several false identities. Similar examples
where a manipulator neither gains nor loses power exist for the three indices.
3.3 Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
We recall that a WVG in which there is a single winning coalition and such that every
agent is critical to the coalition is a unanimity WVG (see Section 2.1).
3.3.1 Exact Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
For exact unanimity WVGs, Aziz and Paterson [36] proved the following results:
Proposition 1. In a unanimity WVG with q = w(I), if Banzhaf indices are used as payoffs
of agents in a WVG, then it is beneficial for an agent to split up into several agents. The
same holds for Shapley-Shubik power index.
We extend these results for the Deegan-Packel power index as follows.
Theorem 1. In an exact unanimity WVG with q = w(I), if the Deegan-Packel index is
used to compute the power of agents, then, it is advantageous for an agent to split up into
several false identities.
Proof. Let G be an exact unanimity WVG of n agents with quota q = w(I). It is easy to see
that the Deegan-Packel power index of every agent i in game G, γi(G) =
1
n . Suppose agent
1 splits into m + 1 false agents, then we have a new exact unanimity game, G′, of n + m
agents. The Deegan-Packel power index of every agent i in G′, γi(G′) = 1n+m . Hence, the
new Deegan-Packel power index of agent 1 in game G′ is γ1(G′) = m+1n+m >
1
n for n > 1.
The following theorem is immediate from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. Let G be an exact unanimity WVG of n agents with quota q = w(I). Suppose
an agent i splits into several false agents in a new game G′. Using the Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel power indices, the power of the manipulating agent assigned
via each of the power indices increases as the number of splits increases.
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Corollary 1. Let G be an excess unanimity WVG with w(I) > q. Let an agent i split into
several false agents in a new game G′. Suppose the new game G′ is also a unanimity WVG,
then the splitting is advantageous for i if any of Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel
power index is used to compute the agent’s power.
3.3.2 Excess Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
From the assumption of Corollary 1, the new game that results when an original excess
unanimity WVG is altered may not necessarily remains unanimity. Consider the following
examples.
Example 3. Advantageous Split for Excess Unanimity
Let G = [5, 3, 3; 10] be an excess unanimity WVG of three agents. The Shapley-Shubik
power of each agent in this game is 0.3333. Suppose the first agent alters G by splitting
its weight among four false agents with weights, 2, 1, 1, 1, such that the new game G′ =
[3, 3,2,1,1,1; 10]. Note that G′ is non-unanimity. The sum of the Shapley-Shubik power of
the false agents, ϕ11(G
′)+
∑4
j=2 ϕ1j (G
′) = 0.2667+3×0.0667 = 0.4668 > ϕ1(G). The agent
benefits from the split action and increases its power index by a factor, τ = 0.46680.3333 = 1.40,
of the original index.
Example 4. Disadvantageous Split for Excess Unanimity
Let G = [5, 5, 5; 11] be an excess unanimity WVG of three agents. The Shapley-Shubik
power of each agent in this game is 0.3333. Suppose the third agent alters G by splitting
its weight among three false agents with weights, 2, 2, 1, such that the new game G′ =
[5, 5,2,2,1; 11]. Note that G′ is non-unanimity. The sum of the Shapley-Shubik power of
the false agents,
∑3
j=1 ϕ3j (G
′) = 3× 0.0333 = 0.0999 < ϕ3(G). The agent incurs a decrease
in power, and its power decreases by a factor of τ = 0.09990.3333 = 0.30.
It is interesting to observe that, unlike in exact unanimity WVGs where splitting into
several false identities is typically advantageous for a manipulator, the situation is not the
same for the case of excess unanimity WVGs. It is clear from the examples above that it
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may or may not be advantageous for a manipulator to split into several false identities if
the original game is an excess unanimity WVG. This, as seen, is a positive result for game
designers in that splitting into several identities in this type of game is not guaranteed to
always be advantageous for manipulators. We now provide bounds for the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf indices on the extent of gains a manipulator may achieve when the original
game is an excess unanimity WVG and the resulting game after splitting is non-unanimity
WVG.
Theorem 3. Let G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] be an excess unanimity WVG of n agents. If an
agent i alters G by splitting into k ≥ 2 false agents in a new game G′, and such that G′
is not a unanimity WVG, then, the power index of the agent in the new game using the
Shapley-Shubik index is at most k(k−1)n+k−1ϕi(G).
Proof. It is clear that the only winning coalition in game G consists of all the agents in
the game since G is unanimity. So, ϕx(G) =
1
n , for all agents x ∈ I in game G. Suppose
agent i splits into k ≥ 2 false identities, i1, . . . , ik, in game G′, and such that G′ is not
unanimity. There are now n+ k − 1 agents in game G′. Observe that since G is unanimity,
all the remaining agents in G (i.e., excluding agent i) cannot meet the quota of the game in
G′. Thus, the only possibility for a particular false agent ij to be pivotal in any permutation
of the agents in G′ is this:
All the non-manipulating agents and zero or more false agents precede agent ij , and
the remaining false agent(s) appear after ij . Note that at least one false agent must
appear after ij since G
′ is non-unanimity.
Let ΠG′ be the set of all permutations of agents in game G
′. Consider any permutation
pi ∈ ΠG′ . Let the false agent ij be pivotal at location r in pi. When there is no false agent
before location r, there are at most (n− 1)! ·C(k− 1, 0) · 1 · (k− 1)! possible permutations2
for agent ij to be pivotal, since there are n− 1 non-manipulating agents before r and k− 1
false agents after r. Similarly, when there is only one false agent before location r, there are
2C(n, r) = n!
r!(n−r)! .
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at most n! ·C(k−1, 1) ·1 ·(k−2)! possible permutations for agent ij to be pivotal, since there
are now n agents (n − 1 non-manipulating agents and 1 false agent) before r, C(k − 1, 1)
ways of chosing the false agent that appear before r, and the remaining k − 2 false agents
appear after r. We continue this process until there are at most k − 2 false agents before r
(analogously, until there is only 1 false agent after r). So, in general, it easy to see that the
false agent ij will be pivotal in at most the following number of permutations:
k−2∑
p=0
(n+ p− 1)! · C(k − 1, p) · (k − p− 1)!
By the same argument, each of the k false agents is pivotal for the same number of
permutations. So, we have3
k
k−2∑
p=0
(n+ p− 1)! · C(k − 1, p) · (k − p− 1)!
= k
k−2∑
p=0
(n+ p− 1)! · (k − 1)!
p!
= k!
k−2∑
p=0
(n+ p− 1)!
p!
· (n− 1)!
(n− 1)!
= k! · (n− 1)!
k−2∑
p=0
C(n+ p− 1, p)
= k! · (n− 1)! · C(n+ k − 2, k − 2)
= k! · (n− 1)! · (n+ k − 2)!
(k − 2)! · n!
=
k · (k − 1) · (n+ k − 2)!
n
.
Hence, the sum of the Shapley-Shubik power of the false agents in G′,
3We use this combinatorial identity to simplify the summation:
∑k
p=0 C(n+ p, p) = C(k + n+ 1, k).
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k∑
j=1
ϕij (G
′) ≤ k · (k − 1) · (n+ k − 2)!
n · (n+ k − 1)!
=
k · (k − 1)
n · (n+ k − 1)
=
k · (k − 1)
n · (n+ k − 1) · n ·
1
n
=
k(k − 1)
n+ k − 1ϕi(G).
Theorem 4. Let G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] be an excess unanimity WVG of n agents. If an agent
i alters G by splitting into k ≥ 2 false agents in a new game G′, and such that G′ is not
a unanimity WVG, then, the power index of the agent in the new game using the Banzhaf
index is at most nkn+k−1βi(G).
Proof. Recall that ηx(G) is the number of winning coalitions for which an agent x is critical
in a WVG G. It is clear that the only winning coalition in game G consists of all the agents
in the game since G is unanimity. So, ηx(G) = 1 and βx(G) =
1
n , for all agents x ∈ I in
game G. Suppose agent i splits into k ≥ 2 false identities, i1, . . . , ik, in an altered game G′,
and such that G′ is not unanimity. The sum of the Banzhaf power of the false agents in the
altered game G′, is given as
k∑
j=1
βij(G
′) =
∑k
j=1 ηij(G
′)∑k
j=1 ηij(G
′) +
∑
x∈I\{i} ηx(G′)
(3.1)
We first bound the number of coalitions in the non-unanimity WVG G′ for which each
of the non-manipulating agents is critical. Since G is unanimity, any winning coalition in G′
must include all of the n− 1 non-manipulators and one or more of the false agents. There
are 2k−1 ways of selecting one or more of the false agents and adding them to the coalition
consisting of only the n− 1 non-manipulating agents. Thus, each of the non-manipulating
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agents can be in at most 2k − 1 coalitions consisting of the false agents. However, since not
all of these possible coalitions will be winning, we let the number of winning coalitions in
G′ be m ≤ 2k − 1. Hence, ∑x∈I\{i} ηx(G′) ≤ m(n− 1) ≤ (2k − 1)(n− 1).
We now bound the number of coalitions for which the false agents are critical. We
partition the false agents into two groups: critical splinters and excess splinters. Critical
splinters are a minimal set of false agents that when added to a set of non-manipulators cre-
ate a winning coalition. Excess splinters are false agents that are not critical (or make some
critical splinters not to be critical) when added to a winning coalition of non-manipulators
and critical splinters. Since we are not interested in non-winning coalitions, we only need
to consider the cases where there are enough critical splinters to make the coalitions win-
ning. Let c be the average number of critical splinters in each of the winning coalitions. Note
that c is bounded by k, so, all the false agents can be critical in at most km coalitions, i.e.,∑k
j=1 ηij(G
′) = cm ≤ km.
Thus, Equation 3.1, becomes
k∑
j=1
βij(G
′) =
cm
cm+m(n− 1)
≤ km
km+m(n− 1)
=
k
n+ k − 1
=
k
n+ k − 1 · n ·
1
n
=
nk
n+ k − 1 · βi(G).
3.4 Non-Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
Manipulation by splitting in non-unanimity WVGs is more interesting as it provides
complex and realistic scenarios that are not well-understood. As the structure of the WVGs
changes due to splitting by a manipulating agent, the number of winning coalitions as well
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as the minimal winning coalitions in the games change. Consider a WVG with quota q,
involving agents I. If any agent i ∈ I has weight wi ≥ q, then the agent will always win
without forming coalitions with other agents. The more interesting games we consider are
those for which wi < q for all i, and such that q satisfies the inequality q ≤ w(I)−m, where
m is the weight of the smallest agent in the game. When the grand coalition emerges, it
will always contain at least one agent that is not critical in the coalition. It is easy to see
that the resultant games are non-unanimity WVGs.
3.4.1 Weight Splitting into Several False Identities
It is important to observe that for a certain manipulating agent, i, with weight, w,
there are different possible ways the agent can split w among k > 2 false agents. Since it is
not clear which of the possible weights combinations of the false agents gives an improved
power, a straightforward approach will be to simply enumerate all such possible splits of
agent i into k false agents and check the factors of power gained for a split that gives the
highest improved power. All such possible splits correspond to the population of splits of
the manipulating agent’s weight (i.e., all possible altered WVGs) that the agent needs to
consider. Unfortunately, enumerating all such possible splits of agent i into k false agents
is non-trivial even if the weights are restricted to integers. This is actually the well-known
problem of partitioning of integer w into k parts or less [38]. Thus, it is impractical to
examine all the splits of the false agents in the population even for small values of w and k.
We propose a simple sampling procedure, to address this problem. The procedure pro-
vides a huge simplification in computational effort and significant benefits for manipulating
agents to engage in manipulation by splitting in non-unanimity WVGs.
Simple Sampling Procedure
A simple approach we employ here is to consider samples of WVGs from the population
of altered WVGs created by the splits of the manipulating agent’s weight. The information
contained within the samples is then used to investigate properties of the population from
which the samples are drawn [47].
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We consider a WVG G of n agents having a distinct manipulating agent i with integer
weight w. For agent i to split its weight w among k false agents, we generate the population
of the splits for weight w as the set P (w, k), containing all j-way splits, s = (w1, . . . , wj),
of false agents such that 3 ≤ j ≤ k. A random sample, S ⊂ P (w, k), of splits of a particular
size (determined as described below) is then taken from the population. For each split
s ∈ S, the procedure first removes w from WVG G, adds the split s = (w1, . . . , wj) to
create an altered WVG G′, and then computes the factor of the power gained or lost by the
agent. We then conduct an exhaustive search of S for the split having the highest factor
of increment and return the split as the way the agent should split its weight in game
G. We provide a simple justification for using this approach. Using the definition of P (w, k)
above, we note that |P (10, 10)| = 36, whereas, |P (50, 10)| = 55, 461. So, for the trivial cases
when w ≤ 10, examining every element of P (w, k) in the partition to determine the split
with the highest factor of increment seems reasonable, and can be done exactly by simple
enumeration. However, this is not the case as w increases. A crucial factor that determines
the performance of this method is the sample size |S| taken from the population. For our
experiments, we have used sample sizes determined as 10% of the population size.
3.4.2 Simulation Settings
In order to evaluate the behavior of the power indices for the non-unanimity WVGs,
we conduct experiments to analyze the effects of manipulation by splitting using each of the
three indices when a strategic agent splits its weight in the games. The values of the power
indices of the several false agents into which the agent splits are added and compared with
the power index of the agent in the original game. We have used a total of 100 original WVGs
for each experiment, allow a manipulating agent to split its weight in each of the games
using the Simple Sampling procedure, and finally compute the factor of increment over the
entire set of games for the three indices. For each game, the number, k, of false agents into
which a manipulating agent, i, splits is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over
the range [3, 7], while ensuring that k ≤ w, where w is the weight of the agent.
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Figure 3.1. Estimation of the extent of susceptibility of the power indices to manipulation
by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling procedure. WVGs are
generated by normal distribution.
3.4.3 Empirical Results and Discussion
Results from the experiments show the existence of beneficial splits when agents engage
in splitting into several false identities for the three power indices. However, the extent to
which agents gain varies with the indices. We use box plots in the presentation of our
results. Box plots are graphical representations used to illustrate the center and spread
of group of data, such as the lower and upper limits, quartiles (lower, median, and upper
quartiles), and mean. We show in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, box plots summarizing the results
of the extent of susceptibility of the three power indices to manipulation by splitting into
several false identities using the Simple Sampling Procedure for 100 WVGs. This is achieved
by comparing the population of the factor of increment attained by agents in different games
for each indices. The results are respectively for WVGs generated by normal (Figure 3.1),
uniform (Figure 3.2), and Poisson (Figure 3.3) distributions. The x-axes show the three
power indices while the y-axes are the factors of increment over the samples of WVGs
achieved by manipulating agents.
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Figure 3.2. Estimation of the extent of susceptibility of the power indices to manipulation
by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling procedure. WVGs are
generated by uniform distribution.
Figure 3.3. Estimation of the extent of susceptibility of the power indices to manipulation
by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling procedure. WVGs are
generated by Poisson distribution.
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The high susceptibility of the Deegan-Packel index to manipulation by splitting can be
observed from the figures. The maximum gain attained by manipulating agents while using
the Deegan-Packel index is about 6.1 (normal), 6.0 (uniform), and 5.3 (Poisson) times of
their original values. On the other hand, the maximum gain attained while using any of the
Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf index is less than a factor of 3.5 of their original values for the
three distributions. Furthermore, while the average4 factor of increment for manipulation is
high for the Deegan-Packel index (∼ 3.0) for the three distributions, those of the Shapley-
Shubik (∼ 1.1 (normal), ∼ 1.0 (uniform), ∼ 1.2 (Poisson)) and Banzhaf (∼ 1.1 (normal
& uniform), ∼ 1.2 (Poisson)) are a little bit low. On average, splitting does not appear
to improve power using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, especially for both the
normal and uniform distributions. We also show (in Table 3.1), the standard deviations of
the factor of power gained by manipulators from the data of Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 for the
normal, uniform, and Poisson distributions. These results suggest that the Deegan-Packel
index is more susceptible to manipulation by splitting into several false identities than the
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices in non-unanimity WVGs. They are also indicative of
the ease by which each of the power indices is manipulable.
Table 3.1. The standard deviations of the factor of increment from the data of Figures 3.1,
3.2, and 3.3 for the three distributions.
Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index Deegan-Packel index
Normal Distribution 0.23 0.29 0.94
Uniform Distribution 0.21 0.26 0.79
Poisson Distribution 0.33 0.23 0.87
Finally, the number of games that are advantageous and disadvantageous for the three
power indices are analyzed. Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, show the number of advantageous
and disadvatageous games from the samples considered for our experiments for the nor-
mal, uniform, and Poisson distributions respectively. All the games are advantageous for
the Deegan-Packel index across the three distributions. There are 64 and 90 games that
are advantageous respectively for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for the Poisson
4The diamond symbols in the box plots indicate the mean values of the datasets.
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Figure 3.4. The number of advantageous and disadvantageous games among the three
indices for manipulation by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling
procedure in 100 non-unanimity WVGs. WVGs are generated by normal distribution.
distribution. See Figure 3.6. However, for both the normal and uniform distributions only
43 and 36 are advatageous for the Shapley-Shubik index. Lastly, there are 78 and 73 games
that are advantageous, respectively, for the normal and uniform distributions using the
Banzhaf index. See Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Clearly, the Deegan-Packel index is more suscep-
tible to manipulation by splitting into several false identities than the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indices.
These results are important for the following reasons. First, since beneficial weight
splitting into many identities can easily be achieved with the Simple Sampling procedure,
this may provide some motivation for agents to engage in manipulation especially using the
Deegan-Packel index. Second, no previous work has considered the evaluation of the extent
of the effects of splitting into several identities in non-unanimity WVGs. Lastly, we see that
there are no significant differences in all the results for the WVGs (generated by the normal,
uniform, and Poisson distributions) that were used in the experiments.
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Figure 3.5. The number of advantageous and disadvantageous games among the three
indices for manipulation by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling
procedure in 100 non-unanimity WVGs. WVGs are generated by uniform distribution.
Figure 3.6. The number of advantageous and disadvantageous games among the three
indices for manipulation by splitting into several false identities using the Simple Sampling
procedure in 100 non-unanimity WVGs. WVGs are generated by Poisson distribution.
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3.5 Normal Distribution and Normality Tests on Real-world Voting Systems
Since we found no significant difference in the results we obtained for the three distri-
butions (i.e., normal, uniform, and Poisson) as demonstrated in the previous sections, we
use the normal distribution in the remaining part of the dissertation to generate agents’
weights in our experiments. Our use of the normal distribution is further motivated by some
normality tests we carried out on three real-world weighted voting systems. We conducted
normality checks (using graphical checks and numerical tests from statistics [48]) on these
voting systems and found that the weights of the games are normally distributed. We il-
lustrate some of the results of our normality checks on recent datasets (i.e., as at 2012)
from the European Union (EU), the Electoral College (EC) of the United States, and the
International Monetary Funds (IMF). We provide evidence of appropriateness of relevant
assumptions by using the graphical checks for normality and our conclusions are as follows:
Histograms with Normal Curves : The histograms with normal curves for the three
datasets (i.e, the EU, EC, and IMF) are normal or almost normal (in some cases), sug-
gesting that the weights are normally distributed. See Figure 3.7 for the histogram with
normal curve for the 2012 Electoral College’s Weights of the United States. The weights are
included in Appendix A for completeness.
Normal Probability Plots : Normal probability plots compare observed values to ex-
pected (normal) values. The plots are approximately linear for the three datasets, so we
conclude that the weights of the players in the voting systems are normally distributed for
each of the datasets. See Figure 3.8 for the normal probability plot for the 2012 Electoral
College’s weights of the United States. Also see the appendices for similar curves and plots
for the European Union (Appendix B), and International Monetary Funds (Appendix C)
datasets.
Numerical Test for Normality : We went further to confirm the results of the graphical
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Figure 3.7. The histogram with normal curve for the 2012 Electoral College’s weights of
the United States.
Figure 3.8. The probability plot for the 2012 Electoral College’s weights of the United
States.
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checks above by performing numerical tests for normality for the three datasets. The notable
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test provides p-values of > 0.150 (for EC), > 0.150 (for EU), and 0.136
(for IMF) which are all greater than the significance level, α = 0.05. Thus, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the data values, i.e., the weights of the players in the games are
normally distributed.
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CHAPTER 4
NEW BOUNDS ON SPLITTING INTO SEVERAL FALSE
IDENTITIES
4.1 Overview
We continue the investigation of manipulation by splitting into several false identities
in this chapter. Since our experimental results of the previous chapter have suggested ideas
on the extent to which the indices are susceptible to manipulation by splitting in the general
case of non-unanimity WVGs, we complement those results with new theoretical bounds,
thereby generalizing earlier results on this problem.
Bachrach and Elkind [35] consider the computational aspects of manipulation by split-
ting in WVGs. They use the Shapley-Shubik power index to evaluate agents’ power and
consider the case when an agent splits into exactly k = 2 false identities. The extent to
which agents may increase or decrease their Shapley-Shubik power is also bounded. The
authors show that for any WVG of n players, a manipulator cannot gain more than a factor
of 2nn+1 < 2, while the agent cannot lose more than a factor of
n+1
2 of its original power
by splitting into two false agents. Similar results were obtained by [36] using the Banzhaf
power index. They show that the maximum gain a manipulating agent can achieve is at
most twice its value in the original game. Recently, Aziz et al. [14] provide a lower bound
on manipulation by splitting using the Banzhaf index. Their bound shows that for any split
of a manipulator into two false agents, the agent can hope to get at least 1n of its original
power in a new game.
The two papers [35,36], left as an open problem, the bounds on the case when an agent
splits into k > 2 false identities for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. This
problem, until now, also remains open in the recent work of [14]. In this chapter, we partially
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resolve this open problem by providing the first three non-trivial bounds on the effect
of manipulation by splitting into several false identities for both the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indices. One of the bounds is also shown to be asymptotically tight (i.e., there
exists at least a game in which an agent can achieve the proposed factors of increment by
splitting into several false identites).
4.2 Shapley-Shubik Power Index Bounds
We propose new bounds for manipulation by splitting into several identities using the
Shapley-Shubik power index.
Theorem 5. (Upper Bound). Let G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] be a WVG of n agents. If an agent i
alters G by splitting into k ≥ 2 false agents in a new game G′, then, the power index of the
agent in the new game using the Shapley-Shubik index is at most nkn+k−1ϕi(G). Moreover,
this bound is asymptotically tight.
Proof. Let an agent i be a distinguished manipulator that splits into k false agents, i1, . . . , ik.
Let ΠG−i be the set of all permutations of the remaining n− 1 agents in game G (i.e., not
including agent i). We define the term, i-pivotal-basis, to be a permutation pi ∈ ΠG−i such
that it is possible to insert agent i into pi to make i pivotal in game G. We refer to the
resulting permutation as being i-pivotal. See Figures 4.1 (a) and (c) for visual illustrations
of these definitions. Define also pi′ to be a morphed permutation in game G′ as one formed
from inserting the false agents, i1, . . . , ik, into permutation pi in any order. Suppose there are
Pi i-pivotal permutations that can be formed from the set ΠG−i, then, the Shapley-Shubik
index of agent i in game G, ϕi(G) =
Pi
n! .
Our hope is that for every case where the insertion of agent i into a permutation pi
makes i pivotal in game G we can create X ∈ N permutations in which a false agent is
pivotal in the corresponding morphed permutation pi′ of game G′. There are two ways we
can get permutations in game G′ in which one of the false agents is pivotal:
A. Insert the false agents, i1, . . . , ik, into a permutation in game G for which agent i is
not pivotal, but a false agent is now pivotal in the altered game G′.
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B. Insert the false agents, i1, . . . , ik, into an i-pivotal-basis permutation pi. Those seem
like good candidates, because the resulting permutation after inserting i into pi is
i-pivotal, so a false agent may be pivotal in the morphed permutation pi′ of game G′.
Case A: We show that there are no permutations in this case. Suppose there exists a
morphed permutation of game G′ in which a false agent ij is pivotal, but the permutation
pi∗ ∈ ΠG−i in game G from which it is formed is not i-pivotal-basis. This permutation in G′
has the following form:
C ij D
where, C and D, are respectively the left and right sides of the morphed permutation from
the pivotal false agent ij . Taking this permutation, create a new permutation by sliding
all the false agents from C right towards ij . Also, slide all the false agents from D left
towards ij . Now, all the false agents occur together with ij still pivotal in this new permu-
tation. This shows that the insertion of agent i into the permutation pi∗ makes i pivotal in
game G. Thus, pi∗ is i-pivotal-basis. Since this is a contradiction to our assumption, there
are no permutations in this case.
Case B: Consider a certain i-pivotal-basis permutation pi ∈ ΠG−i for which the insertion
of agent i makes i pivotal in game G. We need to insert the false agents, i1, . . . , ik, into this
permutation. This is done by the following steps:
1. Decide on which of the k false agents should be pivotal in the newly created permu-
tation. There are C(k, 1) = k ways1 of doing this.
2. Order the remaining false agents, and call this ordering, ρ. There are (k− 1)! ways of
doing this.
3. Now, merge ρ with pi without changing the order of elements in ρ or pi to create a
new permutation pi′. To understand how to count the ways of doing this, realize that
1C(n, r) = n!
r!(n−r)! .
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there are n− 1 items in pi and k − 1 items in ρ. To get a complete ordering, we form
a new permutation by taking the next element of pi or ρ. This is simply permutations
with repetition2, which gives, (n−1+k−1)!(n−1)!(k−1)! .
4. To complete the new permutation, we place the agent selected in step 1 at the ap-
propriate spot in the permutation. There is at most one possibility. Either we find a
place to insert the agent to make it pivotal, or we cannot.
Now, from steps 1 to 4 above, we see that there are at most k·(k−1)!·1·(n−1+k−1)!(n−1)!(k−1)! =
k·(n+k−2)!
(n−1)! possible ways of finding a new permutation in which a false agent is pivotal in
pi′. We repeat the process for each of the Pi i-pivotal-basis permutations pi ∈ ΠG−i. Hence,
the sum of the Shapley-Shubik power of the false agents in game G′,
k∑
j=1
ϕij (G
′) ≤ Pi · k · (n+ k − 2)!
(n− 1)!(n+ k − 1)!
=
Pi · k
(n− 1)!(n+ k − 1)
=
k
(n− 1)!(n+ k − 1) · n! ·
Pi
n!
=
nk
(n+ k − 1)ϕi(G).
We now prove that this bound is asymptotically tight. Let G = [k, k, . . . , k;nk] be a
WVG of n agents. It is clear that the only winning coalition consists of all the agents. So,
ϕi(G) =
1
n for all agents i ∈ I in the game. Suppose the last agent splits into k false
identities each with weight 1, we have a new game G′ = [k, k, . . . , k, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
;nk] of
n + k − 1 agents. Then, ϕi(G′) = 1n+k−1 for each agent i in the altered game G′. Hence,∑k
j=1 ϕnj (G
′) = kn+k−1 =
nk
n+k−1ϕn(G).
2Consider a director who decides whether to take from pi or ρ. He says “original” to take from pi or
“splinter” to take from ρ. He must say “original” n− 1 times and “splinter” k − 1 times.
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Figure 4.1. Illustration of definitions of terms for proofs of Theorems 2 and 3: (a) An i-
pivotal-basis permutation with agent i removed. (b) Four false agents i1, i2, i3, and i4 that
manipulating agent i splits. (c) An i-pivotal permutation with manipulating agent i pivotal
starting from location r. (d) All the false agents are adjacent at location r of the i-pivotal-
basis permutation with one of them pivotal. (e) The false agents are not all adjacent from
location r and one of them is pivotal. (f) The false agents are not all adjacent from location
r and none of them is pivotal.
Theorem 6. (Lower Bound). Let G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] be a WVG of n agents. If an agent i
alters G by splitting into k ≥ 2 false agents in a new game G′, then, the power index of the
agent in the new game using the Shapley-Shubik index is at least kC(n+k−1,k−1)ϕi(G).
Proof. Let agent i be a manipulator that splits into k false agents, i1, . . . , ik, in an altered
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game G′. Consider any i-pivotal-basis permutation pi ∈ ΠG−i of agents in game G. Define
r such that when agent i is inserted into pi at location r, i is pivotal (see Figures 4.1 (a)
and (c)). Now, consider a morphed permutation pi′ in game G′ formed from inserting the
false agents into pi, in which a false agent is pivotal. While there are many permutations pi′
that can be morphed from pi in which a false agent is pivotal, at the very least, we know
that if all false agents are adjacent (in any order) and are inserted at location r in pi, one
of the false agents must be pivotal (see Figure 4.1 (d)). Thus, for each pi, there are k! such
permutations that can be morphed from pi. Notice, that we have ignored all other cases
where the false agents are not adjacent in the permutation and one of the false agents is
also pivotal (see Figure 4.1 (e)).
Suppose there are Pi i-pivotal permutations that can be formed from the set ΠG−i in
game G, then, the sum of the Shapley-Shubik power of the false agents in game G′,
k∑
j=1
ϕij (G
′) ≥ k! · Pi
(n+ k − 1)!
=
k!
(n+ k − 1)! · n! ·
Pi
n!
=
k!n!
(n+ k − 1)!ϕi(G)
= k · (k − 1)!n!
(n+ k − 1)!ϕi(G)
=
k
C(n+ k − 1, k − 1)ϕi(G).
It is important to note that when the number of false agents is k = 2, our bounds (for
the Shapley-Shubik power index) that we propose above agree with those found in [14].
4.3 Banzhaf Power Index Bound
We propose new bound for manipulation by splitting into several identities using the
Banzhaf power index.
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Theorem 7. (Upper Bound). Let G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] be a WVG. If an agent i alters G by
splitting into k ≥ 2 false agents in a new game G′, then, the Banzhaf power index of the
agent in the new game can be as much as k · βi(G).
Proof. Let i be a manipulator that splits into k false agents, i1, . . . , ik, with corresponding
weights, wi1 , . . . , wik , in a new game G
′. We assume without loss of generality that wi1 ≤
· · · ≤ wik . Define a base coalition, SG−i, to be a set of agents from a winning coalition in a
WVG G for which agent i is removed. Note that there are three possibilities for any agent
to be critical in a winning coalition in game G:
1. Winning coalitions which do not contain agent i.
2. Winning coalitions which contain agent i, but in which i is not critical.
3. Winning coalitions in which agent i is critical.
Now, we need to transform each winning coalition in G to coalitions in the game G′,
and then count the number of critical agents in each transformed coalition.
Case 1: Let X1 be the total number of winning coalitions in game G which do not contain
agent i. Let X2 be the average number of the critical agents in each of these winning coali-
tions. Since agent i is not present in any of these winning coalitions, the winning coalitions
are not changed by transformation. Thus, the total number of critical agents from this case
in the new game, G′, is X1 ·X2.
Case 2: Let Y1 be the total number of winning coalitions which contain agent i, but in
which i is not critical. Let Y2 be the average number of critical agents in each of these
coalitions. To create coalitions in G′, we add 1 or more of the false agents to the base
coalition SG−i to create a new winning coalition S′G′−i. There are 2
k − 1 ways of selecting 1
or more of the false agents. No false agent will be critical, since agent i was not critical in
SG−i, but every critical agent in SG−i will still be critical in S′G′−i. Thus, we have a total
of Y1 · Y2 · (2k − 1) critical agents.
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However, as we remove some of the false agents from the coalition, we could create
new critical agents. For example, in the game [5,5,5;10], coalition, {5, 5, 5}, has no critical
agents, but coalition {5, 5, 4} has two critical agents where none were critical before. Let Y3
be the average number of new critical agents created in each transformed coalition. Thus,
the number of critical agents in this case can be counted as Y1 ·Y2 ·(2k−1)+Y1 ·Y3 ·(2k−2).
Case 3: Let Z1 be the total number of winning coalitions in which agent i is critical. Let
Z2 be the number of critical agents in each of these winning coalitions (not counting agent
i). Note that we do not expect Z2 to be the same for each winning coalition, but for
simplicity, we assume Z2 is the average number. To create a coalition in G
′, we add 1
or more of the false agents to the base coalition, SG−i, to create a new winning coalition
S′G′−i. There are 2
k−1 ways of selecting 1 or more of the false agents. Since i was critical in
the original coalition, we must add enough false agents to SG−i to make S′G′−i winning. For
example, if the sum of the weights of agents in SG−i is w, and the quota of game G is q,
the false agents which are added must be of a cumulative weight of at least w − q. We call
this needed weight from the false agents, the i-need :
a. If the sum of the weights of false agents added is less than i-need, the coalition is
losing and no critical agents will be contributed from this case.
b. If the sum of the weights of the false agents is as close to i-need without having
excess false agents, the transformed coalition will be winning and every false agent
will be critical. The critical agents of SG−i will also be critical in S′G′−i. For simplicity
of analysis, we assume that the false agents are all of the same weight. Let p be the
minimal number of false agents that are required to meet the i-need. There are C(k, p)
ways of selecting which false agents are present in the transformed coalition. The
number of winning coalitions in which the false agents are critical is Z1 · p · C(k, p),
since there are Z1 base coalitions, C(k, p) ways of deciding which of the p false agents to
include, and all the p false agents will be critical. However, in each of these transformed
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coalitions, the agents which were critical in the base coalition are still critical. Thus,
the total number of critical agents is: Z1 · p · C(k, p) + Z1 · Z2 · C(k, p).
c. If the added false agents exceed i-need, the transformed coalition will be winning but
it is possible that none of the false agents is critical. The critical agents of SG−i will
also be critical in S′G′−i. We must count how many false agents are critical and how
many total agents are critical from this case. For simplicity, we assume that all false
agents are of the same weight, so that by adding an extra false agent, none of the
false agents is critical. There are C(k, p+ 1) + . . .+C(k, k) =
∑k
j=p+1C(k, j) ways of
selecting p + 1 or more of the false agents. Thus, the total number of critical agents
are Z1 · Z2 ·
∑k
j=p+1C(k, j).
Putting it altogether, the total number of critical agents (including the k false agents):
X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 · (2k − 1) + Y1 · Y3 · (2k − 2) + Z1 · p · C(k, p) + Z1 · Z2 · C(k, p)
+ Z1 · Z2 ·
k∑
j=p+1
C(k, j)
= X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 · (2k − 1) + Y1 · Y3 · (2k − 2) + Z1 · p · C(k, p) + Z1 · Z2 ·
k∑
j=p
C(k, j).
Now, the original Banzhaf power of agent i in game G is
βi(G) =
Z1
Z1 +X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 + Z1 · Z2
.
Similarly, the new power of agent i in game G′ (which is the sum of the power of the false
agents) is
k∑
j=1
βij (G
′) =
Z1 · p · C(k, p)
X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 · (2k − 1) + Y1 · Y3 · (2k − 2) + Z1 · p · C(k, p) + Z1 · Z2 ·
∑k
j=pC(k, j)
.
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The ratio, τ =
∑k
j=1 βij (G
′)
βi(G)
, gives,
p · C(k, p)(Z1 +X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 + Z1 · Z2)
X1 ·X2 + Y1 · Y2 · (2k − 1) + Y1 · Y3 · (2k − 2) + Z1 · p · C(k, p) + Z1 · Z2 ·
∑k
j=pC(k, j)
.
Since we want to find the highest possible ratio, we need to determine cases which
maximize the ratio. Note that the ratio of increase of poweri of agent i is bounded by,
1
poweri
,
since the new power of the agent can be at most 1. We note that if p is small,
∑k
j=pC(k, j)
approaches 2k. Since a large denominator makes for a small ratio, terms in the denominator
which are multiplied by 2k without terms in the numerator being multiplied by a large
number drive down the ratio. Consider the case in which Y1 · Y2 = 0 and Y1 · Y3 = 0. Let
p = k. Now our ratio becomes: k(X1·X2+Z1+Z1·Z2)X1·X2+k·Z1+Z1·Z2 which is bounded by k. Thus, there are
cases where splitting into several false identities improves the power of a manipulator by a
factor of as much as k.
We next show the existence of such a case. Let G = [w1, w2, . . . , wn; q] be a unanimity
WVG of n agents such that q =
∑n
i=1wi. It is clear that the only winning coalition consists
of all the agents. So, βi(G) =
1
n for all agents i ∈ I in the game. Suppose the last agent splits
into k false identities, we have a new game G′ = [w1, w2, . . . , wn−1, wn1 , wn2 , . . . , wnk ; q] of
n+k−1 agents. Then, βi(G′) = 1n+k−1 for each agent i in the altered game G′. The ratio of
the new power to the original power of the manipulator is nkn+k−1 . So, as n goes to infinity,
the denominator approaches n. Thus, the ratio goes to k.
Similarly, as k →∞, the denominator approaches k, and the ratio goes to n. Thus, we
see that if the original power is 1n , then, we cannot improve by more than a factor of n.
We conclude this chapter with a summary of the updated results on the bounds for
manipulation by splitting into k ≥ 2 false identities in WVGs in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Summary of the bounds for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices when an
agent i in a WVG G of n agents splits into k ≥ 2 false agents, i1, . . . , ik, in an altered WVG
G′ of n+ k − 1 agents.
Bounds Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index
Upper (k = 2) ϕi1(G
′) + ϕi2(G′) ≤ 2nn+1ϕi(G) [35] βi1(G′) + βi2(G′) ≤ 2βi(G) [36]
Lower (k = 2) ϕi1(G
′) + ϕi2(G′) ≥ 2n+1ϕi(G) [35] βi1(G′) + βi2(G′) ≥ 1nβi(G) [14]
Upper (k > 2)
∑k
j=1 ϕij (G
′) ≤ nkn+k−1ϕi(G)
∑k
j=1 βij (G
′) ≤ kβi(G)
Lower (k > 2)
∑k
j=1 ϕij (G
′) ≥ kC(n+k−1,k−1)ϕi(G) ?
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CHAPTER 5
MANIPULATION BY MERGING IN WEIGHTED
VOTING GAMES
5.1 Overview
Felsenthal and Machover [37] characterize situations when it is advantageous or dis-
advantageous for agents to merge into a bloc, and show that using the Shapley-Shubik
index, merging can be advantageous or disadvantageous. Aziz and Paterson [36] focus on
the complexity of finding advantageous merging. They show that for unanimity WVGs,
it is disadvantageous for a coalition to merge using the Shapley-Shubik index to compute
payoff. Also, finding an optimal beneficial merge is NP-hard for both the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf indices [14]. It is important to note that none of these papers deal with the
experimental evaluation and analysis of the type of beneficial merging that we consider
here.
In this chapter, we provide examples to illustrate manipulation by merging in WVGs.
Second, we consider the difficulty of predicting beneficial merges in WVGs. Third, we pro-
vide experimental investigation and analysis of manipulation by merging in WVGs using
the three indices. Fourth, given that the problem of computing the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf power indices of agents is NP-complete [4, 21], we present an enumeration-based
pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for merging that manipulators may use to find a much
improved power gain. Finally, we consider evaluation of the opportunities for beneficial
merging in WVGs. Here, we argue and provide empirical evidence to show that despite
finding the optimal beneficial merge is an NP-hard problem for both the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf power indices, finding beneficial merge is relatively easy in practice.
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5.2 Examples of Manipulation by Merging
We have used the Deegan-Packel index as a reference for these examples. The effects of this
manipulation are summarized in a table for each example using the three power indices. The
manipulating agents are all shown in bold.
Example 5. Advantageous Merging for Deegan-Packel index.
Let G = [8,7, 4,4,2, 1, 1; 28] be a WVG of seven agents. Let the manipulators’ coalition
C consists of the three agents in bold i.e., with weights 7, 4, and 2. The cumulative power of
these manipulators,
∑
i∈C γi(G) = 0.452. Suppose these manipulators merge their weights
to form a single bloc &C and alter G to give a new game G′ = [13, 8, 4, 1, 1; 28]. The
power of the bloc is γ&C(G
′) = γ1(G′) = 0.500 > 0.452. The factor of power gained by the
manipulators is τ = 0.5000.452 = 1.11.
Note that we have implicitly assumed that agents in the blocs formed are working
cooperatively and have transferable utility. Thus, proceeds from merging can easily be
distributed among the manipulators. For instance, in this example, each manipulator may
first be assign a payoff equal to what it would get in the original game G, then, the gain
(i.e., 0.500−0.452 = 0.048) derived from the altered game G′ can then be distributed among
the members of C using different solution concepts for revenue distribution from coalitional
game theory.
Table 5.1. Advantageous merging showing the cumulative power of the assimilated agents
in the original game G = [8,7, 4,4,2, 1, 1; 28], the power of the bloc in the altered game
G′ = [13, 8, 4, 1, 1; 28], and the factor of increment for the three power indices.
Power Index Original game G Altered game G’ Factor (Increment)
Shapley-Shubik 0.488 0.667 1.37
Banzhaf 0.485 0.600 1.24
Deegan-Packel 0.452 0.500 1.11
Not all manipulation by merging is beneficial. Example 6 illustrates a non-beneficial
merge for manipulators.
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Example 6. Disadvantageous Merging for Deegan-Packel index.
Let G = [9,8, 5,5, 4, 3, 1; 30] be a WVG of seven agents. Let the manipulators’ coalition
C = {1, 2, 4}. The cumulative power of these manipulators, ∑i∈C γi(G) = 0.508. Suppose
these manipulators merge their weights to form a single bloc &C and alter G to give a
new game G′ = [22, 5, 4, 3, 1; 30]. The power of the bloc is γ&C(G′) = γ1(G′) = 0.306 <
0.508. The factor of power lost by the manipulators is τ = 0.3060.508 = 0.60.
Table 5.2. Disadvantageous merging showing the cumulative power of the assimilated agents
in the original game G = [9,8, 5,5, 4, 3, 1; 30], the power of the bloc in the altered game
G′ = [22, 5, 4, 3, 1; 30], and the factor of decrement for the three power indices.
Power Index Original game G Altered game G’ Factor (Decrement)
Shapley-Shubik 0.676 0.467 0.69
Banzhaf 0.579 0.368 0.64
Deegan-Packel 0.508 0.306 0.60
We have shown that manipulators may gain or lose power using the three power indices
when they engage in manipulation by merging. Similar examples where manipulators neither
gain nor lose power exist for the three indices.
5.3 Difficulty of Predicting Beneficial Merge and Power Vectors
We provide visual description of manipulation by merging in WVGs to explain the
intricases of what goes on during manipulation, and examines the effects of small changes
in the weights of agents on their corresponding power in WVGs using power vectors [49].
5.3.1 Difficulty of Beneficial Merge Prediction in Weighted Voting Games
A visual description clarifies manipulation by merging in WVGs (see Figure 5.1). We use
the Shapley-Shubik power index for illustration. Consider a WVG of three agents denoted
by the following patterns: Agent 1 ( ), Agent 2 ( ), and Agent 3 ( ). The weight of each
agent in the game is indicated by the associated length of the pattern. A box in the pattern
corresponds to a unit weight. Each row represents a permutation. Suppose all permutations
of the three agents are given as shown in Figure 5.1. We can use the same figure to consider
a range of quotas from 1 to 6 for the game. The Shapley-Shubik indices of the three agents
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Figure 5.1. Six permutations of 3 agents and the power indices of the agents for values of
quota from q = 1 to q = 6.
Figure 5.2. Manipulation by merging between Agent 1 and Agent 3 (from Figure 5.1) to
form a new Agent X. The indices of Agent X and Agent 2 computed by Shapley-Shubik
index after merging for various values of quota are also shown.
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are computed from the figure and shown in the associated table of the figure. These power
indices for the agents in the game correspond to using various values of the quota for the
same weights of the agents.
Consider a manipulation where Agent 1 and Agent 3 merge their weights to form a new
agent, Agent X. Here, Agent 1 and Agent 3 cease to exist since they have been assimilated by
Agent X. Thus, we have only two agents (Agent X and Agent 2) in the altered WVG. Figure
5.2 shows the results of the merging between Agent 1 and Agent 3. Notice that the number
of rows has been reduced to two, as there are now only two possible orderings. Consider the
cases when the quota of the game is 1 or 6, the power of the assimilated agents for Agent
X from Figure 5.1 shows that Agent 1 and Agent 3 each has a power of 13 for a total power
of 23 . The power of Agent X which assimilates these two agents in the two cases is each
1
2 <
2
3 . Also, the power of the manipulators stays the same for the cases where the quota
is either 2 or 5. Specifically, the sum of the powers of Agent 1 and Agent 3 is 12 for these
cases. This is also true of Agent X for these cases. Finally, for the cases where the quota
of the game is 3 or 4, the power of Agent X is 1 which is greater than 56 , the sum of the
powers of Agent 1 and Agent 3 in the original game.
Note the difficulty of predicting what will happen when manipulators engage in merg-
ing. This illustration also shows that the choice of the quota of a game is crucial in determin-
ing the distribution of power of agents in a WVG. An apparent question that concerns the
manipulators from the illustration above is the following : Can effective merging heuristics
be found even though predicting beneficial merging is difficult?
5.3.2 Using Power Vectors
Recall the definition of power vector (from Section 2) of a WVG of n agents as an
n-dimensional vector v ∈ Rn of the power of each of the agents in the game listed in
order. Using power vectors, we investigate the effects of small changes in the weights of
agents on their corresponding powers in WVGs. The Shapley-Shubik index is used in this
illustration. The small changes in the weights of agents are related to weights changes
when two or more agents merge their weights to form a bloc, thus providing some insights
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Figure 5.3. Using power vectors to illustrate the effects of small changes in the weights of
agents on their corresponding Shapley-Shubik powers in WVGs.
into merging. A crucial observation is that we can have many games having the same power
vector. For example, the following WVGs: [11, 9, 4; 12], [11, 8, 5; 12], [11, 7, 6; 12], [10, 9, 5; 12],
[10, 8, 6; 12], and [10, 7, 7; 12] all have the same power vector [0.33, 0.33, 0.33], even though
the weights’ distribution of agents in the games differ.
In Figure 5.3, we consider all WVGs of 3 agents such that the total weights of the agents
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in each game is 24. Figures 5.3(a), 5.3(b), and 5.3(c) are for the cases when the quotas q
of the games are 12, 16, and 18, respectively. The y-axes indicate the possible weights of
the first agent while the x-axes indicate the possible weights of the second agents in the
games. Note that since agents weights are given in non-increasing order, the possible weights
for the second agent are dependent on the weights of the first agent. The possible weights
of the third agents are not shown since they can implicitly be derived from the weights of
the first two agents. Only 4 power vectors are attainable in the WVGs of 3 players using
the Banzhaf index [49], there are also 4 different power vectors for these games when the
number of agents is 3 and using the Shapley-Shubik index. These power vectors are coded
as 1, 2, 3, and 4 below:
1 : [0.33, 0.33, 0.33]
2 : [0.50, 0.50, 0.00]
3 : [0.67, 0.17, 0.17]
4 : [1.00, 0.00, 0.00]
with the games of each power vector representing appropriate regions shaded in Figure
5.3. The following facts from the figures have impact on weight changes as it relates to
merging in the games:
• The number of different power vectors is a function of the number of agents, n, in the
games.
• The size of the region (associated with a particular power vector) changes with the
quota.
• Some power vectors are volatile to changes with respect to small changes in weight
(such as [11, 7, 6; 18]) while others are not (such as [12, 11, 1; 18]).
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5.4 Susceptibility of Power Indices to Manipulation by Merging
Previous work [36], has shown that for unanimity WVGs, and for both the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices: it is disadvantageous for a coalition to merge. In view of this
positive result (as game designers are interested in discouraging agents’ participation in ma-
nipulation), and the fact that strategic agents are interested in only mergings that improve
their power, we consider manipulation by merging for only the non-unanimity WVGs. In
order to evaluate the behavior of the three power indices for merging in non-unanimity
WVGs, we conduct experiments to analyze the effects of merging when two or more agents
merge into a bloc. We first provide a description of the simulation settings and then present
the empirical evidence gathered from the experiment.
5.4.1 Simulation Settings
The WVGs were generated as described in Section 2.3. For each game, we determine
the three power indices of the agents in the game. Since manipulation by merging requires
coordinated action of the manipulators, strategic agents are selected among the agents in
the WVGs to form the blocs of manipulators. The assimilated blocs of the manipulators
are formed by k ∈ N agents in each game; we refer to k as the bloc size or the number of
assimilated agents. The blocs sizes and the members of the blocs are chosen uniformly at
random1 from the set {2, 3, . . . , 10}, while also ensuring that k ≤ n, where n is the number
of agents in a game. We compute the new power index of the bloc in the altered games
next. Then, we determine the factor of increment by which the bloc gains or loses in the
manipulation for the corresponding bloc sizes. The power of the bloc is compared to the
sum of the original powers of the assimilated agents in the bloc.
For our study, we generated 2, 000 original WVGs of various bloc sizes, allow manip-
ulation by the bloc of manipulators, and compute the factors of increment over all the
games. The factors of increment provides the extent of susceptibility to manipulation by
1We note that randomly generating members of the blocs fails to consider the benefits of a more strategic
approach to manipulation. We address this issue in the next section.
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each of the three indices. We estimate this relationship among the three indices by compar-
ing their factors of increment simultaneously in similar games.
5.4.2 Empirical Results and Discussion
Experiments confirm the existence of advantageous merging for the non-unanimity
WVGs. However, the extent to which agents gain varies among the indices. We provide
a comparison of susceptibility to manipulation by merging among the three indices by
comparing the population of factors of increment attained by strategic agents in different
games for each of the indices. A summary of susceptibility to manipulation by merging
among the three indices is shown in the box plot of Figure 5.4. The x-axis indicates the
power indices while the y-axis is the factor of increment achieved by agents in the 2, 000
WVGs.
Figure 5.4. Susceptibility to manipulation by merging among the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf,
and Deegan-Packel indices for non-unanimity weighted voting games.
From the figure, the highest gain attained by manipulation blocs for the three indices
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are ∼ 1.9 for Shapley-Shubik, ∼ 2.1 for Banzhaf, and ∼ 2.0 for the Deegan-Packel in-
dex. Since the highest factors of increment are extreme values, they are not indicative of
the true behavior to compare merging in the three power indices. Let us consider the mean
value of the data (which serves as a central measure) from this experiment. We note that, on
average, only the Shapley-Shubik index appears to be susceptible to manipulation by merg-
ing for this type of game. The average factor of increment for the three power indices are
∼ 1.12 for Shapley-Shubik, ∼ 0.90 for Banzhaf, and ∼ 0.60 for the Deegan-Packel index. An
important positive result that is observable from Figure 5.4 is that the highest average
factor of increment for the three indices is less than a factor of 1.2, and the corresponding
absolute highest value is less than a factor of 2.2. We shall see (in the next chapter) the
reason for the importance of these values when we compare with the factor of increments for
annexation, where similar measures are typically very high. To further see the relationship
among the three indices on their susceptibility to manipulation by merging, we compare
the percentages of advantageous, disadvantageous, and neutral games in the 2, 000 WVGs.
Figure 5.5. Percentage of advantageous, disadvantageous, and neutral games among the
power indices for manipulation by merging in 2, 000 non-unanimity weighted voting games.
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of advantageous, disadvantageous, and neutral games
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for manipulation by merging among the three indices. Examination of the 2, 000 WVGs
reveals that more than 71% of the games are advantageous for Shapley-Shubik index, about
42% for the Banzhaf index, and less than 14% of the games for the Deegan-Packel in-
dex. Even for the cases where the games are advantageous for the three indices, the factor
of increment achieved by the blocs of manipulators are not very high, and in most cases
are less than a factor of 2. This analysis suggests that the Shapley-Shubik index is more
susceptible to manipulation by merging than the Banzhaf and Deegan-Packel power indices
for non-unanimity WVGs, even though the factor of increment is not high. Now, since
only the Shapley-Shubik index is more susceptible to manipulation by merging, and also,
since the factor by which the bloc of manipulators gains is very low, this may provide less
motivation for strategic agents to generally engage in manipulation by merging for non-
unanimity WVGs when they are being evaluated using any of the three power indices, and
in particular, when the Deegan-Packel index is employed.
We have some comments regarding these results. First, we found that our results of
manipulation by merging for the non-unanimity WVGs are consistent with those of manip-
ulation by splitting into several false identities of the previous chapter. A scenario where
splitting by a strategic agent is disadvantageous corresponds to a scenario where it is advan-
tageous for several strategic agents to merge. Second, we have assumed that the assimilated
agents in the blocs can easily distribute the gains from their collusion among themselves
in a fair and stable way. Thus, making them agree to engage in the manipulation if it is
profitable. This assumption is strong. Even at that, we see that the three power indices are
less vulnerable to manipulation by merging.
5.5 Algorithm for Merging in Weighted Voting Games
We note that randomly selecting the agents to be assimilated for merging as proposed
in the previous experiment fails to consider the benefits of a more strategic approach to
manipulation. We propose an enumeration-based approach for merging. In considering our
enumeration-based approach to merging, we have implemented a pseudo-polynomial ma-
nipulation algorithm. Given that computing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices is
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NP-complete, and only pseudo-polynomial or approximation algorithms are available to
compute agents’ power, it is reasonable that the manipulation algorithm we propose is
also pseudo-polynomial, since we necessarily need to use these power indices in comput-
ing agents’ benefits during manipulation. Aziz et al. [14] have also shown that determining
if there exists a beneficial merge is NP-hard using either the Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf
indices.
5.5.1 Manipulation Algorithm for Merging
A straightforward approach to determine a coalition that yields the most improved
benefit in merging in a WVG is to simply enumerate all the possible coalitions of agents
in the game and then compute the benefit for each of these coalitions. We can then output
the coalition with the highest value. Unfortunately, enumerating all the possible coalitions
is exponential in the number of agents. Also, computing the power indices naively from
their definitions means that we have two exponential time problems to solve. We provide
an alternative approach.
Let procedure PowerIndex(G, i) be a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for computing the
power index of an agent i in a WVG G of n agents for Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf index ac-
cording to any of [4,22,23]. We first use PowerIndex (G, i) as a subroutine in the construction
of a procedure, GetMergeBenefit(G,S). Procedure GetMergeBenefit(G,S) accepts a WVGG
and a would-be manipulators’ coalition, S. It first computes the sum of the individual power
index of the assimilated agents in S using PowerIndex(G, i). Then, it alters G by replacing
the sum of the weights of the assimilated agents in G with a single weight in a new game G′
before computing the power of the bloc &S in G′. Finally, GetMergeBenefit(G,S) returns
the factor of increment of the merged bloc &S. Let A(G) be the pseudopolynomial running
time of PowerIndex (G, i). Now, since |S| ≤ |I| = n, procedure GetMergeBenefit(G,S) takes
at most O(n ·A(G)) time which is pseudopolynomial.
We now use GetMergeBenefit(G,S) to construct an algorithm that manipulators can
use to determine a coalition that yields a good benefit in merging. We first argue that
manipulators tend to prefer coalitions which are small in size because they are easier to
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form and less likely to be detected. Also, intra-coalition coordination, communication, and
other overheads increase with coalition size. Thus, we suggest a limit on the size of the
manipulators’ coalitions since it is unrealistic and impractical that all agents in a WVG
will belong to the manipulators’ coalition. This reasoning is consistent with the assumptions
of the previous work on merging [14] as well as coalition formation [50]. We note, however,
that limiting the manipulators coalitions’ size does not change the complexity class of the
problem as finding the coalition that yields the most improved benefit remains NP-hard.
Consider a WVG of n agents. Suppose the manipulators’ coalitions, S, have a limit,
k < n, on the size of the coalitions, i.e., S, are bounded as 2 ≤ |S| ≤ k. In this case,
the number of coalitions that the manipulators need to examine is at most O(nk) which is
polynomial in n. Specifically, the total number of these coalitions is:
 n
2
+
 n
3
+ · · ·+
 n
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j
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Running GetMergeBenefit(G,S) while updating the most2 improved benefit found so
far from each of these coalitions requires a total running time of O(nk · A(G)) which is
2We refer to the most improved benefit among the O(nk) polynomial coalitions and not from the original
2n coalitions since we have restricted each manipulators’ coalition size to a constant k < n.
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pseudopolynomial, and thus becomes reasonable to compute for small k.
5.5.2 Evaluation of the Manipulation Algorithm for Merging
It is impractical that strategic agents would employ the random simulation approach
of the previous section (i.e., Subsection 5.4.1) to engage in manipulation by merging. This
is because simply guessing a particular coalition from among all the exponential possible
coalitions does not provide a good chance for strategic agents to benefit significantly in the
manipulation. We note also that this chance of success by the manipulators decreases as
the number of agents in a game becomes large. Now, since it is impractical to exhaustively
consider all the exponential possible coalitions, we have presented a pseudo-polynomial
manipulation algorithm where we have restricted the sizes of coalitions to be considered
by the manipulators to a constant k which is less than the number n of the agents in
the game. Our idea is for the manipulators to sacrifice optimality for good merging. By
doing so, the manipulation algorithm potentially bypass a lot of search. Although, this
manipulation algorithm is incomplete, nonetheless, it considers more search space than the
random approach, and hence, is guaranteed to find a much improved factor of increment
than the random simulation method.
We perform experiments to confirm the above hypothesis. First, we make a simple modi-
fication to the random simulation approach which provides manipulators with higher average
factor of increment. The modification involves the selection of the best factor of increment
from three random choices (which we refer to as the best-of-three method). We compare
results of our enumeration-based method with those of the best-of-three method. Unlike
the random simulation approach where merging has little or no benefits for manipulators
using both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, results from our experiments suggest
that manipulation via merging can be highly effective.
The WVGs for this experiment were generated as described in Section 2.3 while the
simulation setting is similar to those of Section 5.4.1. We have used a total of 2, 000 original
WVGs for this experiment and compute the average factor of increments over the entire
set of games for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices. The evaluation is
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carried out for the proportion of agents in manipulators’ blocs in the WVGs. We compare
the results of the enumeration-based method with those of the best-of-three method.
Figure 5.6. The average factor of increment for merging for the enumeration-based and
best-of-three methods using various values of size of bloc divided by the number of agents
in the games (Shapley-Shubik).
Figure 5.7. The average factor of increment for merging for the enumeration-based and
best-of-three methods using various values of size of bloc divided by the number of agents
in the games (Banzhaf).
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the benefits from merging for both the best-of-three and
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enumeration-based methods using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The x-axes in-
dicates the proportion of agents in the manipulators’ bloc (i.e. |S||I| =
k
n) whose factor of
increment were reported while the y-axes are the average factor of increment achieved by ma-
nipulating agents in those coalitions. For the Shapley-Shubik power index, Figure 5.6 shows
that manipulating agents achieved improved power using the enumeration-based approach
than using the best-of-three method. There are cases where the manipulators achieved more
than 2.4 times as much as the original power for the enumeration-based method, and in
general the average factor of increment is between 1.5 and 2.7 times the original power of the
manipulators. Whereas, the best-of-three method has only minor effects for the manipula-
tors as the average factors of increment in these tests are below 1.3. Similar trends between
the enumeration-based and best-of-three methods are observed for the case of Banzhaf in-
dex too (see Figure 5.7). However, the average factor of increment is lower for the two
methods using the Banzhaf index. On average, merging does not appear to significantly
improve power using the best-of-three method for either the Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf
index, and in most cases is harmful for the agents. Thus, finding a good manipulation is
non-trivial. We conclude that since improvement in power over the best-of-three method
can be achieved with only a polynomial amount of work by considering small coalition size,
then, manipulators are more likely to seek a much improved power gain in merging using
the enumeration-based approach.
5.6 Evaluation of Opportunities for Beneficial Merging
We conduct further experimental investigations to provide understanding and analysis
of the opportunities for beneficial merging available for strategic agents in WVGs. Previous
work [14] has shown that finding a beneficial merge is NP-hard for both the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf power indices, and leaves the impression that this is indeed so in practice. Al-
though this worst case complexity for manipulation by merging is daunting, it is possible
that real instances of WVGs are easy to manipulate. We note that real WVGs are small
enough that exponential amount of work may not deter manipulators from participating in
manipulation by merging. Hence, manipulations may, in some cases, be achieved in practice.
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Also, even though real life WVGs may consist of small number of agents, to date, a
careful investigation of effective heuristics for manipulating such games by merging are yet
to be researched [36]. This, we argue, may be primarily due to the inherent difficulty of the
problem. This is because the ability to find beneficial merging depends on the characteristics
of the game. Some games have little opportunity for merging while others could have many
beneficial merges. So, in contrast to the work of [14], we study experimental evaluation of
the effects of merging using parameters of the games to analyze opportunities for beneficial
merging for the manipulators. This, we believe, will provide insight into understanding of
the problem and also guide the decisions of game designers.
5.6.1 Simulation Settings
The WVGs for the experiments here were generated as described in Section 2.3. How-
ever, for clarity of presentation, the number of agents, n, in each of the original WVGs is
10. We have also restricted the number of assimilated agents, k, in each game to 2. This is
consistent with the assumptions of previous work on merging [14, 45] and coalition forma-
tion [50], as manipulators’ blocs of small sizes are easier to form, and more importantly to
the manipulators, they are less likely to be detected by other agents in the games. Apart
from this, we also believe that an indepth understanding of this case (i.e., k = 2), will
provide necessary background in understanding of the general case of when k > 2.
We have used a total of 2, 000 distinct WVGs for our experiments. For each game, we
vary the quota of the game from 12w(I) + 1 to w(I) in steps of 10, where w(I) is the sum
of the weights of all agents in the game. We then compute the factor of increment for each
assimilated bloc of size 2 in a game using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The
evaluation is carried out for the proportion of beneficial merges in a game and the quota
ratio, qw(I) =
quota
total weight . The quota ratios for the experiments range from 0.5 to 1.0, and
indicate the fraction of the total weight needed for the quotas. A quota ratio of 1.0 suggests
the existence of a unanimity WVGs, where all agents in a game are needed to form a winning
coalition. Thus, a winning coalition always exists in the games. In other words, the quota
ratio is a measure of the percentage of weight needed to form a winning coalition.
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We consider all possible manipulators’ blocs of size 2. The percentage of beneficial
merge for a quota ratio is the fraction of cases whose factors of increment is greater than
a specified value of τ , i.e., a factor of power gain in a game. We tweak τ using different
values to see how the percentage of beneficial merges varies and provide discussions of the
effects noticed below. The pseudocode to compute the percentage of beneficial merges for
each quota ratio is given in Figure 5.8.
percentBeneficialMerge(Agents I, WVG G, τ) {
for quota q of G from 12w(I)+1 to w(I) step 10
successCount = 0;
totalCount = 0;
for each manipulators’ bloc b of size 2
compute factor of increment f for b
if f > τ then
successCount++;
totalCount++;
end for
quotaRatio = q / w(I);
percentBenefit = successCount / totalCount;
end for
}
Figure 5.8. Pseudocode to compute the percentage of beneficial merges for each quota ratio.
5.6.2 Empirical Results and Discussion
We present the results of our experiments. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 are indications of the
opportunities for beneficial merging available for the manipulators. The x-axes are the quota
ratios and the y-axes are the percentage of beneficial merging available to the manipulators
when a beneficial merge is defined as τ = 1, i.e., a factor of power gain greater than 1.
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Figure 5.9. Percentage of beneficial merging for various values of quota ratio when a bene-
ficial merge is defined to have a factor of power gain greater than 1.0 (Shapley-Shubik).
Figure 5.10. Percentage of beneficial merging for various values of quota ratio when a
beneficial merge is defined to have a factor of power gain greater than 1.0 (Banzhaf index).
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Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show that finding a beneficial merge is relatively easy in practice,
at least for the WVGs we considered, and restricting each manipulators’ blocs to size 2. In
reality, finding the best merging may not even be desirable, as it assumes every agent will
be willing to merge. Manipulators cannot petition every agent to see if they are willing
to merge, as the manipulators would have announced their intent to cheat. However, a
dishonest agent may first discover opportunities for beneficial merging before suggesting
such merge to other would-be manipulators.
The figures show that beneficial mergings are easy to find and almost impossible to
stop. While it appears from the figures that we may be powerless to stop merging for a given
game, the game designer may be able to control the quota. Thus, a high quota ratio reduces
the opportunities for dishonesty as the percentage of beneficial merges goes down. Using
both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices to compute agents’ power, we can deduce
from the figures that the Banzhaf index is more desirable to avoid cheating especially for
high quota ratios. This is because the percentages of beneficial mergings for high values of
the quota ratio using the Banzhaf index are smaller compare to those of the Shapley- Shubik
index. Table 5.3 shows the means and standard deviations of the factor of power gained
by manipulators from Figures 5.9 and 5.10. This shows that, on average, manipulation
by merging is easier using the Shapley-Shubik index than using the Banzhaf index. This
also indicates that the Banzhaf index may be more desirable to avoid manipulation in this
situation.
Table 5.3. The means and standard deviations of the factor of power gained for Figures 5.9
and 5.10 using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices.
Power Indices Shapley-Shubik Index Banzhaf Index
Mean 1.142 1.062
Standard deviation 0.182 0.057
For the second set of experiments, we consider a more realistic scenario for the manip-
ulators. Even though we have defined a beneficial merge as a merge in which manipulators
have a power gain with τ > 1, manipulators may only be interested in beneficial merge with
appreciable gains as the risks of being detected by the mechanism may exceed the
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Figure 5.11. Percentage of beneficial merging for various values of quota ratio when a
beneficial merge is defined to have a factor of power gain greater than 1.15 (Shapley-Shubik).
Figure 5.12. Percentage of beneficial merging for various values of quota ratio when a
beneficial merge is defined to have a factor of power gain greater than 1.15 (Banzhaf index).
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anticipated benefits. Now, we restrict the minimal beneficial rate to τ = 1.05 or 1.10, and
do not notice appreciable change in the percentage of beneficial merging compared with
those of Figures 5.9 and 5.10. Thus, we do not report them here.
However, for value of τ = 1.15, which represents at least a 15% anticipated increment
from the original power of the manipulators, we noticed a sharp contrast from earlier re-
sults. This is an interesting and positive result for the designer of a game as it shows that
the percentage of beneficial merges drops for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power
indices. See Figures 5.11 and 5.12. The opportunities for beneficial merge for the manip-
ulators using the Shapley-Shubik index may still be high, even when the factor of power
gained has been increased to τ = 1.15. However, for the case of the Banzhaf index (see
Figure 5.12), the maximum percentage of beneficial merge available for the manipulators is
considerably less. We argue that it is not unlikely that low percentage of beneficial merge
may discourage manipulators in engaging in manipulation by merging if these conditions
that we describe prevail and also using the Banzhaf power index to compute agents’ power.
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CHAPTER 6
MANIPULATION BY ANNEXATION IN WEIGHTED
VOTING GAMES
6.1 Overview
We recall the definition of annexation in Section 2, the power of the assimilated bloc in
an altered WVG is compared to the power of the annexer in the original game. By this def-
inition, intuition suggests that annexation should always be advantageous. This intuition is
indeed true using the Shapley-Shubik index. However, there exists situations where annex-
ation is disadvantageous using the Banzhaf index. This is true of the Deegan-Packel index
too. See [14, 36, 37] for different examples of WVGs where annexation is disadvantageous
using the Banzhaf index. Example 7 below provides an illustration of where annexation is
disadvantageous for the Deegan-Packel index. This situation where annexation results in
power decrease for the annexer is referred to as the bloc paradox [37].
Felsenthal and Machover [2,37] originally studied annexation in WVGs. They consider
when the blocs formed by annexation are advantageous or disadvantageous. Also, Aziz et
al. [14] consider the computational aspects of the problem of annexation in WVGs. They
show that finding optimal beneficial annexation in a WVG is NP-hard using the Banzhaf
index. Our work differs from those of these authors as we consider the extent to which the
agents involved in annexation may gain using the three power indices.
In this chapter, we provide examples to illustrate manipulation by annexation. Second,
we investigate the susceptibility of the three indices to annexation. Third, we present an
enumeration-based pseudo-polynomial algorithm for annexation that manipulators may use
to find a much improved power gain. Finally, we propose and evaluate annexation heuris-
tics. These heuristics require little computational efforts and provide good information for
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annexers to make decisions on how to annex in WVGs.
6.2 Examples of Manipulation by Annexation
We have used the Deegan-Packel index as a reference for these examples. The effects
of this manipulation are summarized in a table for each example using the three power
indices. The annexer as well as other manipulating agents are shown in bold.
Example 7. Advantageous Annexation for Deegan-Packel index.
Let G = [8,5,4, 4, 3, 3, 2; 18] be a WVG of seven agents. Let agent 2 (with weight
5) be an annexer. The power of this agent, γ2(G) = 0.172. Suppose the agent annexes
agent 3 with weight 4. An assimilated bloc of weight 9 is formed in the new game G′ =
[9, 8, 4, 3, 3, 2; 18]. The power index of the bloc formed by the annexer, γ1(G
′) = 0.260 >
γ2(G). The agent gains from the annexation and increases its power index by a factor,
τ = 0.2600.172 = 1.51, of the original index.
Table 6.1. Advantageous annexation showing the annexer’s power in the original game G =
[8,5,4, 4, 3, 3, 2; 18], the altered game G′ = [9, 8, 4, 3, 3, 2; 18], and the factor of increment
for the three power indices.
Power Index Original game G Altered game G’ Factor (Increment)
Shapley-Shubik 0.171 0.350 2.04
Banzhaf 0.171 0.340 1.99
Deegan-Packel 0.172 0.260 1.51
Example 8. Disadvantageous Annexation1 for Deegan-Packel index.
Let G = [9, 9, 9,8, 7, 5,3; 29] be a WVG of seven agents. Let agent 4 (with weight
8) be an annexer. The power of this agent, γ4(G) = 0.171. Suppose the agent annexes
agent 7 with weight 3. An assimilated bloc of weight 11 is formed in the new game G′ =
[11, 9, 9, 9, 7, 5; 29]. The power index of the bloc formed by the annexer, γ1(G
′) = 0.159 <
γ4(G). Even though the weight of the annexer increases (from 8 to 11), the annexer loses
from the annexation and decreases its power index by a factor, τ = 0.1590.171 = 0.93, of the
original index.
1This is an example of the bloc paradox for the Deegan-Packel power index.
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Table 6.2. Disdvantageous annexation showing the annexer’s power in the original game
G = [9, 9, 9,8, 7, 5,3; 29], the altered game G′ = [11, 9, 9, 9, 7, 5; 29], and the factor of incre-
ment/decrement for the three power indices.
Power Index Original game G Altered game G’ Factor (Increment/Decrement)
Shapley-Shubik 0.179 0.217 1.21
Banzhaf 0.177 0.217 1.22
Deegan-Packel 0.171 0.159 0.93
6.3 Susceptibility of Power Indices to Manipulation by Annexation
We assume that only one of the agents is engaging in the annexation.
6.3.1 Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
Aziz and Paterson [36] have shown that for unanimity WVGs in both the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices: it is advantageous for a player to annex other players. We
observe that this result naturally extends to the Deegan-Packel index too. This is because
for unanimity WVGs, the definitions of the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and the Deegan-
Packel indices using Formulas 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, respectively, are equivalent. In fact, the
power of all agents in any unanimity WVGs is the same for the three indices.
Note that Aziz and Paterson have not considered the bounds on the extent to which
strategic agents may gain with respect to games they manipulate. This is important as it
provides motivation for strategic agents to engage in manipulation when derivable gains are
appreciable. The gains (i.e., the factor of increments) show the extent of susceptibility to
manipulation among the power indices. The magnitude of this gain for unanimity WVGs,
as we shall see shortly, depends on the number of agents in the original game, the number
of agents the annexer is able to annex, as well as some compensation that is made to the
assimilated agents to forfeit their weights. Example 9 illustrates a unanimity WVG where
an annexer achieves three times its original power annexing some other agents in a game.
Example 9. Advantageous Annexation for Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
Consider G = [9,9, 8,8,7, 6,6,5, 4,3,2,2,2,1,1; 73], a unanimity WVG of 15 agents
I = {1, 2, . . . , 15} in order. The Deegan-Packel index of any agent in the game is 115 = 0.0667.
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Suppose the second agent with weight 9, annexes the 10-subset, C = {4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15}, of agents in the game (i.e., the agents in bold). The new gameG′ = [46, 9, 8, 6, 4, ; 73].
The annexer has improve its weight to 46. The Deegan-Packel index of the annexer in G′ is
γ1(G
′) = 15 = 0.2000. The agent benefits from the annexation and increases its power by a
factor of 3.
Table 6.3. Annexation in unanimity WVGs showing the annexer’s power in the original
game G = [9,9, 8,8,7, 6,6,5, 4,3,2,2,2,1,1; 73], the altered game G′ = [46, 9, 8, 6, 4, ; 73],
and the factor of increment for the three power indices.
Power Index Original game G Altered game G’ Factor (Increment)
Shapley-Shubik 0.067 0.200 3.00
Banzhaf 0.067 0.200 3.00
Deegan-Packel 0.067 0.200 3.00
It appears that the annexer has achieved a gain of three times its original power while
annexing some other agents, but this is not true in its entirety. We provide the following
arguments. Since the original and the altered games are unanimity, the power of all agents
in each game is the same. While the annexer has improved its weight, and consequently its
power by three times its original power, other agents that were not assimilated have also
had their power increased by the same factor, even though their weights in the original and
altered games remain the same. Clearly, these agents do not incur any compensation that
is made to the assimilated agents to forfeit their weights like the annexer, whose improved
weight and power must have been achieved at some compensation. The compensation made
by the annexer reduces the benefits the agent thought it gained, making the annexer’s
benefit worse than the benefits of other agents not engaging in annexation. This weakens
Aziz and Paterson’s [36] result that for unanimity WVG and for both the Shapley-Shubik
and Banzhaf indices it is advantageous for a player to annex.
Now, suppose we assume that the annexer still accrues some gains even after the appli-
cation of some compensation, then these gains are the same for the three indices. We see that
the extent of susceptibility to manipulation among the three indices are the same. Hence,
for any unanimity WVGs, the manipulability of any one index does not dominate the ma-
nipulability of other indices.
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Finally, the generalization of the upper bound on the extent to which a strategic agent
may gain with respect to games it manipulate in any unanimity WVGs follows from [36]. For
any unanimity WVG of n agents, the power of each agent is 1n . If a strategic agent annexes
k − 1 other agents, the power of the strategic agent as well as that of the other agents in
the new game is 1n−k+1 . Hence, the factor of increment for each agent is
n
n−k+1 . This factor
of increment is the same for the three indices. When k = 1, (i.e., the strategic agent is not
annexing any other agent), then the factor of increment is 1. Whereas, when k = n, the
strategic agent is able to annex the remaining n − 1 agents in the original game, then the
factor of increment is n times the power of the agent in the original game. This is the upper
bound on the extent to which a strategic agent may achieve while annexing other agents in
any unanimity WVG. This bound holds for the three power indices.
6.3.2 Empirical Results for Non-Unanimity Weighted Voting Games
We conduct experiments to evaluate the effects of manipulation when an agent annexes
some other agents in non-unanimity WVGs. The simulation settings for the experiments
in this section are similar to the previous settings described in Section 5.4. We consider
annexation of at least one agent in the game by the annexer, while the weights of other
agents not annexed remain the same in the altered games. For a particular game, the annexer
may annex 1 ≤ k ≤ 10 other agents, k is the bloc size or the number of assimilated agents.
We present the results of our simulations. Experiments confirm the existence of advan-
tageous annexation for non-unanimity WVGs when agents engage in manipulation using
the three indices. We provide a comparison of susceptibility to manipulation by annexa-
tion among the three indices by comparing the population of factors of increment attained
by strategic agents in different games for each of the indices. A summary of susceptibility
to manipulation by annexation among the three power indices for 2, 000 WVGs is shown
in Figure 6.1. The x-axis indicates the bloc sizes while the y-axis is the average factor of
increment achieved by agents in the 2, 000 WVGs for corresponding bloc sizes.
The effect of manipulation by annexation is pronounced for the three power indices,
as all the indices are highly susceptible to manipulation. However, the higher susceptibility
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Figure 6.1. Susceptibility to manipulation by annexation among the Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices for non-unanimity weighted voting games.
of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices than the Deegan-Packel index can be observed
from Figure 6.1. While the average factor of increment for manipulation rapidly grows with
the bloc sizes for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, that of the Deegan-Packel index
grows more slowly. Furthermore, there appears to be a positive correlation between the
average factor of increment and the bloc sizes for the three indices. The figure shows that
the average factor of increment increases with the bloc sizes.
This analysis suggests that the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices are more
susceptible to manipulation via annexation than the Deegan-Packel power index. Since all
the three power indices are susceptible to manipulation via annexation, this may provide
some motivation for strategic agents to generally engage in such manipulation for non-
unanimity WVGs when they are being evaluated using any of the three power indices, and
in particular, when the Shapley-Shubik index is employed.
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6.4 Algorithm and Heuristics for Annexation in Weighted Voting Games
We present manipulation algorithm and heuristics that annexers may use to engage in
annexation in WVGs.
6.4.1 Manipulation Algorithm for Annexation
Our pseudo-polynomial manipulation algorithm for annexation provides a modification
of the manipulation algorithm for merging of Section 5.5. Recall that G is a WVG of n agents
and S is a would-be manipulators’ coalition. As before, let A(G) be the pseudo-polynomial
running time of PowerIndex (G, i), which computes the power index of an agent i in a WVG
G of n agents for Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf index according to any of [4,22,23]. We first re-
place GetMergeBenefit(G,S) with another procedure called, GetAnnexationBenefit(G, i, S).
GetAnnexationBenefit(G, i, S) accepts a WVG G, an annexer, i, and a coalition S to be
assimilated by i. The procedure then returns the factor of increment of the assimilated bloc
&(S ∪ {i}).
We use GetAnnexationBenefit(G, i, S) to construct an algorithm that the annexer can
use to determine the coalition that yields the most improved benefit in annexation. The
method of construction of the algorithm is the same as that of the manipulation algorithm
for merging with the exception that we add the weight of an annexer i to the weight of
each coalition S and compare the power index Φ&(S∪{i})(G′) of the assimilated bloc in a
new game G′ to the power index Φi(G) of the annexer in the original game G. The annexer
examines a polynomial number of coalitions of the agents assuming a limit k < n on the
size of each coalition. Since the annexer belongs to a coalition it annexes, the total number
of coalitions examined by the annexer is:
 n− 1
1
+ · · ·+
 n− 1
k − 1
 = k−1∑
j=1
 n− 1
j
 . (6.1)
Bounding this equation using similar approach as in Equation 5.1 shows that Equation
6.1 is O(nk). Thus, as before, the manipulation algorithm for annexation also runs in pseudo-
polynomial time, with a total running time of O(nk ·A(G)).
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6.4.2 Manipulation Heuristics for Annexation
Unlike the manipulation algorithm for annexation above where we have n and k as the
number of agents and the number of assimilated agents in a WVG, manipulating agents may
not be interested in achieving the most improved power gain among the O(nk) polynomial
coalitions described before. This is because the number of these coalitions may be large
even for small values of n and k. Thus, we propose heuristics that agents may use for
annexation in WVGs. Considering the basic requirements for a good heuristic as its ease of
computation and to be as informative as possible [51], the heuristics we propose are designed
to first avoid the enumeration-based approach of the manipulation algorithm above. Second,
we avoid the simple random approach of Section 6.3.2 to ensure that our heuristics provide
good information for manipulating agents to make decisions on how to annex in WVGs.
Recall from Equation 6.1 that an annexer needs to examine a polynomial number of
assimilated coalitions of size at most k − 1 to find the most improved power gain among
these coalitions whose sizes we have restricted to k. We note also that the assimilated
coalitions with maximal weights among these coalitions are those of sizes k − 1. Thus, it
is enough for a particular annexer to check only the assimilated coalitions of size exactly
k − 1 in order for the annexer to find the coalition with the most improved benefit using
the two power indices. This indeed is the case for the Shapley-Shubik index. For the case
of Banzhaf index, we conduct a test to check the highest factor of increment among all
the coalitions of 2, 000 different WVGs. We found that the coalitions with maximal weights
(i.e., those having sizes of k−1) yield the highest possible factor of increment in over 82% of
the games. The remaining highest factor of increment are archieved by manipulators’ blocs
with lower number of agents in them. In none of these two situations do we experience the
bloc paradox.
Now, there are only
 n− 1
k − 1
 such assimilated coalitions to be considered by this
annexer. As seen, the amount of work carried out by the annexer is still polynomial, however,
this heuristic requires smaller computational effort compared to that of the enumeration-
based method and thus makes it more useful in practice. We can even do better using the
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idea in the following heuristic:
MaximalWeights heuristic:
Given: A WVG of n agents with a distinguished annexer i.
Procedure: Since agents’ weights are given in non-increasing order, let agent i annex
the first k − 1 agents from the remaining n− 1 agents in the game.
Again, let A(G) be the pseudopolynomial running time of Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf
power index of an agent according to [22, 23]. The running time of the MaximalWeights
heuristic is O(n + A(G)). Here is a brief analysis. We just need to sum the weights of the
next k − 1 agents from the remaining n − 1 agents to that of the annexer at a cost of
O(k). In the worst case, it takes O(n) to sum the weights when k = n, i.e., the annexer
is able to annex all the remaining n − 1 agents. Computing the power of the annexer in
each of the original and altered games takes O(A(G)). Therefore, the total running time of
the heuristic is O(n + A(G)). Now, apart from the fact that this heuristic appears to find
the most improved gain, its running time is by far less than the O(nk ·A(G)) running time
of the manipulation algorithm for annexation of Subsection 6.4.1 and the above heuristic
especially when k is large. Thus, the MaximalWeights heuristic is more useful in practice for
the annexer. The benefits achievable by manipulating agents using these heuristics compare
with those of the enumeration-based method which serves as upper bound.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
We investigate the effects of the following forms of manipulation - splitting, merging, and
annexation, in weighted voting games. We consider three prominent power indices, Shapley-
Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices, that are used in evaluating agents’ power in
such games. Our focus is on the characterization of the extent to which strategic agents
may gain engaging in such manipulations, and showing how susceptibility to manipulation
among the three indices compares for unanimity and non-unanimity weighted voting games.
We started with manipulation when an agent splits into several false identities. We
extend a previous result on exact unanimity weighted voting games to the Deegan-Packel
index and present new results for excess unanimity WVGs. Specifically, we propose new
bounds for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices on the extent of gains a manip-
ulator may achieve when the original game is an excess unanimity weighted voting game
and the resulting game after splitting is a non-unanimity weighted voting game. We il-
lustrate the susceptibility of the three power indices to manipulation by splitting through
simulations of a large number of weighted voting games with a manipulating agent in each
of the games. Results from our experiments show that the three indices are susceptible to
manipulation when an agent splits into several false identities. However, the Deegan-Packel
index is more susceptible than the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, with the Shapley-
Shubik being the least susceptible. Hence, using Shapley-Shubik index to evaluate weighted
voting games reduces agents’ motivation towards manipulation by splitting. Second, since
our experimental results have suggested ideas on the extent to which each of the indices
are susceptible to manipulation by splitting, we went further to partially resolve an open
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problem concerning the bounds on the extent of power that a manipulator may gain when it
splits into k > 2 false identities. We provide the first three non-trivial bounds for this prob-
lem using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. One of the bounds is also shown to be
asymptotically tight. The analyses of these novel results not only increase our understand-
ing on the extent of power that manipulators may gain while they engage in manipulation
by splitting in WVGs, they also provide further insights into the problem which we believe
may reveal methods on how to reduce the effects of the menace in the future.
Furthermore, we consider the effects of manipulation by merging and annexation. We
provide visual illustrations of merging in weighted voting games to give some insights into
why it is difficult to predict how to merge. Given that the problems of calculating the
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for weighted voting games are NP-complete, we show
that, when the manipulators’ coalitions sizes are restricted to a small constant, manipulators
need to do only a polynomial amount of work to find a much improved power gain for
both merging and annexation, and then present two enumeration-based pseudo-polynomial
algorithms that manipulators can use. Finally, we examine the effects of small changes
in the weights of agents on their corresponding powers in weighted voting games. This is
illustrated by showing that power vectors are often unchanged. Then, we argue and provide
empirical evidence to show that despite finding the optimal beneficial merge is an NP-hard
problem for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, finding beneficial merge is
relatively easy in practice. Hence, there may be little deterrent to manipulation by merging
in practice using the NP-hardness results. Also, while it appears that we may be powerless to
stop manipulation by merging for a given game, we suggest a measure, termed quota ratio,
that the game designer may be able to control. Thus, we deduce that a high quota ratio
decreases the number of beneficial merges. Using the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices
to compute agents’ power, we conclude that the Banzhaf index may be more desirable to
avoid manipulation by merging, especially for high values of quota ratios.
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7.2 Future Work
There are several areas of ongoing research on these problems. Here are some directions
for future work. It will be interesting to provide a generalized upper bound for Theorem
5 on manipulation by splitting into several false identities. Also, the lower bound when a
manipulator splits into k > 2 false agents using the Banzhaf power index is still open. Fur-
thermore, since our experimental results have suggested ideas on the extent of susceptibility
for manipulation by annexation and merging, other future work we plan to consider are the
bounds on manipulation by annexation and merging in weighted voting games. We also
seek to expand our experimental evaluations on the opportunities for beneficial merging to
understand the general case of manipulators’ blocs of size greater than 2. Again, we seek to
provide careful investigations of effective heuristics for manipulation by merging in weighted
voting games. Finally, there are still several other interesting open problems on false-name
manipulation in weighted voting games from [14].
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Appendix A
ELECTORAL COLLEGE’S WEIGHTS OF THE UNITED
STATES
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Table A.1. 2012 Electoral College’s Weights of the United States.
s/n States Weights
1 California 55
2 Texas 38
3 Florida 29
4 New York 29
5 Illinois 20
6 Pennsylvania 20
7 Ohio 18
8 Georgia 16
9 Michigan 16
10 North Carolina 15
11 New Jersey 14
12 Virginia 13
13 Washington 12
14 Arizona 11
15 Indiana 11
16 Massachusetts 11
17 Tennessee 11
18 Maryland 10
19 Minnesota 10
20 Missouri 10
21 Wisconsin 10
22 Alabama 9
23 Colorado 9
24 South Carolina 9
25 Kentucky 8
26 Louisiana 8
27 Connecticut 7
28 Oklahoma 7
29 Oregon 7
30 Arkansas 6
31 Iowa 6
32 Kansas 6
33 Mississippi 6
34 Nevada 6
35 Utah 6
36 Nebraska 5
37 New Mexico 5
38 West Virginia 5
39 Hawaii 4
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Table A.2. 2012 Electoral College’s Weights of the United States.
s/n States Weights
40 Idaho 4
41 Maine 4
42 New Hampshire 4
43 Rhode Island 4
44 Alaska 3
45 Delaware 3
46 D.C. 3
47 Montana 3
48 North Dakota 3
49 South Dakota 3
50 Vermont 3
51 Wyoming 3
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Appendix B
RESULTS OF NORMALITY CHECK ON THE 2012
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDS DATA
The Executive Board of the IMF at present has 24 executive directors, and is chaired
by a Managing Director in a non-voting capacity. The member countries and thier voting
power are listed in pages 93− 99. The ∗ in front of a country name indicates the chair for
a multi-country constituencies. The actual weight of each country or group is computed
using the country voting power as a percentage of the total voting power of all the countries
or groups. For example, the voting weight of Saudi Arabia is 70,5922,515,703 × 100 = 2.8061 and
that of the United States is 421,9612,515,703 × 100 = 16.7731. Similarly, the voting weight of the
group consisting of Denmark*, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and
Sweden is 85,6152,515,703 × 100 = 3.4032. A complete list of the countries and their computed
corresponding voting weights used in this dissertation is shown in Table B.1.
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Table B.1. Weights of the International Monetary Fund members
Countries Weights
1 Saudi Arabia 2.8061
2 Denmark 3.4032
3 Togo 1.5530
4 Singapore 3.9362
5 France 4.2979
6 Chile 1.8411
7 United Kingdom 4.2979
8 Canada 3.6042
9 United States 16.7731
10 India 2.8101
11 Iran, Islamic Republic of 2.2686
12 Japan 6.2417
13 Italy 4.2296
14 Russia 2.3926
15 Brazil 2.6167
16 Austria 2.9208
17 Venezuela, Republica Boliviriana de 4.9079
18 Gambia, The 3.2988
19 Egypt 3.1825
20 Netherlands 6.5785
21 Germany 5.8191
22 Switzerland 2.7753
23 Korea, Republic of 3.6293
24 China 3.8159
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Figure B.1. The histogram with normal curve for the International Monetary Funds weights.
Figure B.2. The probability plot for the International Monetary Funds weights.
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Appendix C
RESULTS OF NORMALITY CHECK ON THE
EUROPEAN UNION DATA
Table C.1. Voting weights of the European Union members
Countries Weights
1 Germany 29
2 Italy 29
3 United Kingdom 29
4 France 29
5 Spain 27
6 Poland 27
7 Romania 14
8 Netherlands 13
9 Portugal 12
10 Hungary 12
11 Czech Rep 12
12 Belgium 12
13 Greece 12
14 Bulgaria 10
15 Sweden 10
16 Austria 10
17 Slovakia 7
18 Denmark 7
19 Finland 7
20 Ireland 7
21 Lithuania 7
22 Cyprus 4
23 Latvia 4
24 Slovenia 4
25 Estonia 4
26 Luxembourg 4
27 Malta 3
Total 345
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Figure C.1. The histogram with normal curve for the European Union Members’ weights.
Figure C.2. The probability plot for the European Union Members’ weights.
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